The OECD civil servant: caught between Scylla and Chrybdis

TY - JOUR

T1 - The OECD civil servant

T2 - caught between Scylla and Chrybdis

AU - Marcussen, Martin

AU - Trondal, Jarle

PY - 2011/12/20

Y1 - 2011/12/20

N2 - Civil servants in international secretariats are exposed to numerous, cross-cutting and, at times, conflicting pressures and expectations. The secretariat of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is no different. This study reveals a fundamental 'misfit' between external demands and internal dynamics in the OECD Secretariat. On one hand, the OECD analysts are employed on the basis of merit. Compared to the employees in the central administrations in many OECD member states, the OECD personnel are very competitive in terms of experience and academic skills. Thus, the OECD Secretariat can be seen as a veritable powerhouse of idea generation, data collection and analysis. On the other hand, the OECD member states seem to be reluctant to let the OECD do what it does best: produce bright, challenging and provocative ideas. In many regards, the OECD personnel are, in practice, being reduced to undertaking basic secretariat functions such as organizing meetings, writing summaries and arbitrating between conflicting national interests. Despite having a vast role repertoire of roles at their disposal, this article reveals the paradox when OECD officials play out only two roles: the epistemic role, in which creative thinking and innovation are rewarded, and the bureaucratic role, in which rule following and regularity are rewarded. This paradox is characterized as a role dilemma that is compatible with the idea of the OECD as an international compound bureaucracy. The article concludes by suggesting three scenarios of how the observed dissonance between the internal and external dimensions of the OECD identity can be accommodated.

AB - Civil servants in international secretariats are exposed to numerous, cross-cutting and, at times, conflicting pressures and expectations. The secretariat of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is no different. This study reveals a fundamental 'misfit' between external demands and internal dynamics in the OECD Secretariat. On one hand, the OECD analysts are employed on the basis of merit. Compared to the employees in the central administrations in many OECD member states, the OECD personnel are very competitive in terms of experience and academic skills. Thus, the OECD Secretariat can be seen as a veritable powerhouse of idea generation, data collection and analysis. On the other hand, the OECD member states seem to be reluctant to let the OECD do what it does best: produce bright, challenging and provocative ideas. In many regards, the OECD personnel are, in practice, being reduced to undertaking basic secretariat functions such as organizing meetings, writing summaries and arbitrating between conflicting national interests. Despite having a vast role repertoire of roles at their disposal, this article reveals the paradox when OECD officials play out only two roles: the epistemic role, in which creative thinking and innovation are rewarded, and the bureaucratic role, in which rule following and regularity are rewarded. This paradox is characterized as a role dilemma that is compatible with the idea of the OECD as an international compound bureaucracy. The article concludes by suggesting three scenarios of how the observed dissonance between the internal and external dimensions of the OECD identity can be accommodated.

U2 - 10.1080/09692290.2011.603665

DO - 10.1080/09692290.2011.603665

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0969-2290

VL - 18

SP - 592

EP - 621

JO - Review of International Political Economy

JF - Review of International Political Economy

IS - 5

ER -