The "minimal self" in psychopathology: re-examining the self-disorders in the schizophrenia spectrum

Michel René Joseph Cermolacce; Jean Naudin; Josef Parnas

doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2007.05.013

The "minimal self" in psychopathology: re-examining the self-disorders in the schizophrenia spectrum

Michel René Joseph Cermolacce, Jean Naudin, Josef Parnas

77 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The notion of minimal, basic, pre-reflective or core self is currently debated in the philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences and developmental psychology. However, it is not clear which experiential features such a self is believed to possess. Studying the schizophrenic experience may help exploring the following aspects of the minimal self: the notion of perspective and first person perspective, the 'mineness' of the phenomenal field, the questions of transparency, embodiment of point of view, and the issues of agency and ownership, considered as different and less fundamental than the feeling of mineness. Two clinical vignettes of patients with the diagnosis of schizophrenia will be presented: the first one, illustrating early illness stages, and the second case, of chronic schizophrenia, symptomatically marked by persistent hallucinations. Through their analysis, we will discuss the experiential dimensions of minimal self.

Original language	English
Journal	Consciousness and Cognition
Volume	16
Issue number	3
Pages (from-to)	703-14
Number of pages	12
ISSN	1053-8100
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2007.05.013
Publication status	Published - 1 Sept 2007

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The "minimal self" in psychopathology: re-examining the self-disorders in the schizophrenia spectrum

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