The evolution of intellectual property strategy in innovation ecosystems: Uncovering complementary and substitute appropriability regimes

Marcus Holgersson*, Ove Granstrand, Marcel Bogers

*Corresponding author for this work
42 Citations (Scopus)
45 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

In this article, we attempt to extend and nuance the debate on intellectual property (IP) strategy, appropriation, and open innovation in dynamic and systemic innovation contexts. We present the case of four generations of mobile telecommunications systems (covering the period 1980-2015), and describe and analyze the co-evolution of strategic IP management and innovation ecosystems. Throughout this development, technologies and technological relationships were governed with different and shifting degrees of formality. Simultaneously, firms differentiated technology accessibility across actors and technologies to benefit from openness and appropriation of innovation. Our analysis shows that the discussion of competitiveness and appropriability needs to be expanded from the focal appropriability regime and complementary assets to the larger context of the innovation ecosystem and its cooperative and competitive actor relations, with dispersed complementary and substitute assets and technologies. Consequently, the shaping of complementary and substitute appropriability regimes is central when strategizing in dynamic and systemic innovation contexts. This holds important implications for the management of open innovation, innovation ecosystems, platforms, and coopetition.

Original languageEnglish
JournalLong Range Planning
Volume51
Issue number2
Pages (from-to)303-319
Number of pages17
ISSN0024-6301
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2018

Keywords

  • Appropriation
  • Innovation ecosystem
  • Intellectual property right
  • Litigation
  • Open innovation
  • Patent
  • Technology licensing

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