The evolution of conventions under incomplete information

M. Jensen; B. Sloth; Hans Jørgen Whitta-Jacobsen

doi:10.1007/s00199-003-0460-6

The evolution of conventions under incomplete information

M. Jensen, B. Sloth, Hans Jørgen Whitta-Jacobsen

Department of Economics

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Original language	English
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	25
Issue number	1
Pages (from-to)	171-185
ISSN	0938-2259
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0460-6
Publication status	Published - 2005

Keywords

Faculty of Social Sciences
Bayesian games

Access to Document

10.1007/s00199-003-0460-6

Cite this

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