Abstract
We argue that the majority of intelligence definitions fail to recognize that
the normative epistemic status of intelligence is knowledge and not an inferior
alternative. We refute the counter-arguments that intelligence ought not to be seen as knowledge because of 1) its action-oriented scope and 2) its future-oriented content. We dismiss the traditional infallibilistic understanding of knowledge and follow David Lewis’ argument, that knowledge is fallible and context-sensitive. Thus, we argue for the importance of developing a methodology by which the entitlement, justification and robustness of claims to intelligence-knowledge can be assessed.
the normative epistemic status of intelligence is knowledge and not an inferior
alternative. We refute the counter-arguments that intelligence ought not to be seen as knowledge because of 1) its action-oriented scope and 2) its future-oriented content. We dismiss the traditional infallibilistic understanding of knowledge and follow David Lewis’ argument, that knowledge is fallible and context-sensitive. Thus, we argue for the importance of developing a methodology by which the entitlement, justification and robustness of claims to intelligence-knowledge can be assessed.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Intelligence and National Security |
| Pages (from-to) | 1-23 |
| Number of pages | 23 |
| ISSN | 0268-4527 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Oct 2013 |