Abstract
During the ¿nancial crisis, G20 countries compelled tax havens to sign bilateral treaties providing for exchange of bank information. Policymakers have celebrated this global initiative as the end of bank secrecy. Exploiting a unique panel dataset, we study how the treaties a¿ected bank deposits in tax havens. Most tax evaders, our results suggest, did not respond to the treaties. A minority responded by transferring deposits to havens not covered by a treaty. Overall, the G20 tax haven crackdown caused a modest relocation of deposits between havens but no signi¿cant repatriation of funds: the era of bank secrecy is not over.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Place of Publication | Paris |
| Publisher | Paris School of Economics |
| Number of pages | 26 |
| Publication status | Published - 2012 |
Keywords
- Faculty of Social Sciences