The degree of rationality in actual bidding of hydropower at Nord Pool

Erik Nicholas Alnæs; Roger Grøndahl; Stein-Erik  Fleten; Trine Krogh Boomsma

doi:10.1109/eem.2013.6607389

The degree of rationality in actual bidding of hydropower at Nord Pool

Erik Nicholas Alnæs, Roger Grøndahl, Stein-Erik Fleten, Trine Krogh Boomsma

Department of Mathematical Sciences

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In deregulated electricity markets, power producers
bid to sell tomorrow's generation in day-ahead auctions. We analyse bids submitted by three medium to large sized Norwegian reservoir hydropower producers over four two-week periods in 2011. Being price takers, the producers maximize their profits by bidding their marginal cost. Additionally, production must respect both external market rules and internal technical and hydrological restrictions when bidding. Patterns in the submitted bids are found and explanations for the bidding behavior are given. Furthermore, potential irrationalities in the bidding are
revealed.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	10th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM)), : Stockholm, Sweden, 27-31 May 2013
Number of pages	8
Publisher	IEEE
Publication date	2013
ISBN (Print)	978 -1-4799-2008-2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/eem.2013.6607389
Publication status	Published - 2013

Access to Document

10.1109/eem.2013.6607389

Cite this

The degree of rationality in actual bidding of hydropower at Nord Pool. / Alnæs, Erik Nicholas; Grøndahl, Roger; Fleten, Stein-Erik et al.

10th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM)),: Stockholm, Sweden, 27-31 May 2013. IEEE, 2013.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Article in proceedings › Research › peer-review

@inproceedings{480407f159a84f27919cbdeb4e96ab8e,

title = "The degree of rationality in actual bidding of hydropower at Nord Pool",

abstract = "In deregulated electricity markets, power producersbid to sell tomorrow's generation in day-ahead auctions. We analyse bids submitted by three medium to large sized Norwegian reservoir hydropower producers over four two-week periods in 2011. Being price takers, the producers maximize their profits by bidding their marginal cost. Additionally, production must respect both external market rules and internal technical and hydrological restrictions when bidding. Patterns in the submitted bids are found and explanations for the bidding behavior are given. Furthermore, potential irrationalities in the bidding arerevealed.",

author = "Aln{\ae}s, {Erik Nicholas} and Roger Gr{\o}ndahl and Stein-Erik Fleten and Boomsma, {Trine Krogh}",

year = "2013",

doi = "10.1109/eem.2013.6607389",

language = "English",

isbn = "978 -1-4799-2008-2",

booktitle = "10th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM)),",

publisher = "IEEE",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - The degree of rationality in actual bidding of hydropower at Nord Pool

AU - Alnæs, Erik Nicholas

AU - Grøndahl, Roger

AU - Fleten, Stein-Erik

AU - Boomsma, Trine Krogh

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - In deregulated electricity markets, power producersbid to sell tomorrow's generation in day-ahead auctions. We analyse bids submitted by three medium to large sized Norwegian reservoir hydropower producers over four two-week periods in 2011. Being price takers, the producers maximize their profits by bidding their marginal cost. Additionally, production must respect both external market rules and internal technical and hydrological restrictions when bidding. Patterns in the submitted bids are found and explanations for the bidding behavior are given. Furthermore, potential irrationalities in the bidding arerevealed.

AB - In deregulated electricity markets, power producersbid to sell tomorrow's generation in day-ahead auctions. We analyse bids submitted by three medium to large sized Norwegian reservoir hydropower producers over four two-week periods in 2011. Being price takers, the producers maximize their profits by bidding their marginal cost. Additionally, production must respect both external market rules and internal technical and hydrological restrictions when bidding. Patterns in the submitted bids are found and explanations for the bidding behavior are given. Furthermore, potential irrationalities in the bidding arerevealed.

U2 - 10.1109/eem.2013.6607389

DO - 10.1109/eem.2013.6607389

M3 - Article in proceedings

SN - 978 -1-4799-2008-2

BT - 10th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM)),

PB - IEEE

ER -