TY - JOUR
T1 - The dark side of the vote
T2 - Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting
AU - Morton, Rebecca B.
AU - Piovesan, Marco
AU - Tyran, Jean Robert
PY - 2019/1
Y1 - 2019/1
N2 - We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a “dark side,” that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions, information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters is biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the inefficiency. However, in the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective and does not sufficiently de-bias voters.
AB - We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a “dark side,” that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions, information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters is biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the inefficiency. However, in the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective and does not sufficiently de-bias voters.
KW - Cognitive biases
KW - Information aggregation
KW - Social information
KW - Voting
KW - Wisdom of crowds
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85056570405&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.008
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.008
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85056570405
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 113
SP - 461
EP - 481
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
ER -