The blind hens’ challenge: does it undermine the view that only welfare matters in our dealings with animals?

Peter Sandøe; Paul M. Hocking; Björn Forkman; Kirsty Haldane; Helle Halkjær Kristensen; Clare Palmer

doi:10.3197/096327114x13947900181950

The blind hens’ challenge: does it undermine the view that only welfare matters in our dealings with animals?

Peter Sandøe, Paul M. Hocking, Björn Forkman, Kirsty Haldane, Helle Halkjær Kristensen, Clare Palmer

Section for Consumption, Bioethics and Governance

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Animal ethicists have recently debated the ethical questions raised by disenhancing animals to improve their welfare. Here, we focus on the particular case of breeding blind hens for commercial egg-laying systems, in order to benefit their welfare. Many people find breeding blind hens intuitively repellent, yet 'welfare-only' positions appear to be committed to endorsing this possibility if it produces welfare gains. We call this the 'Blind Hens' Challenge'. In this paper, we argue that there are both empirical and theoretical reasons why even those adopting 'welfare-only' views should be concerned about breeding blind hens. But we also argue that alternative views, which (for example) claim that it is important to respect the telos or rights of an animal, do not offer a more convincing solution to questions raised by the possibility of disenhancing animals for their own benefit.

Original language	English
Journal	Environmental Values
Volume	23
Issue number	6
Pages (from-to)	727-742
Number of pages	16
ISSN	0963-2719
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3197/096327114x13947900181950
Publication status	Published - 1 Dec 2014

Access to Document

10.3197/096327114x13947900181950

The_blind_hens_challengeFinal published version, 297 KB

Cite this

@article{bd3b5d9e874d436eb988f2fff6e8fb00,

title = "The blind hens{\textquoteright} challenge: does it undermine the view that only welfare matters in our dealings with animals?",

abstract = "Animal ethicists have recently debated the ethical questions raised by disenhancing animals to improve their welfare. Here, we focus on the particular case of breeding blind hens for commercial egg-laying systems, in order to benefit their welfare. Many people find breeding blind hens intuitively repellent, yet 'welfare-only' positions appear to be committed to endorsing this possibility if it produces welfare gains. We call this the 'Blind Hens' Challenge'. In this paper, we argue that there are both empirical and theoretical reasons why even those adopting 'welfare-only' views should be concerned about breeding blind hens. But we also argue that alternative views, which (for example) claim that it is important to respect the telos or rights of an animal, do not offer a more convincing solution to questions raised by the possibility of disenhancing animals for their own benefit.",

author = "Peter Sand{\o}e and Hocking, {Paul M.} and Bj{\"o}rn Forkman and Kirsty Haldane and Kristensen, {Helle Halkj{\ae}r} and Clare Palmer",

year = "2014",

month = dec,

day = "1",

doi = "10.3197/096327114x13947900181950",

language = "English",

volume = "23",

pages = "727--742",

journal = "Environmental Values",

issn = "0963-2719",

publisher = "TheWhite Horse Press",

number = "6",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - The blind hens’ challenge

T2 - does it undermine the view that only welfare matters in our dealings with animals?

AU - Sandøe, Peter

AU - Hocking, Paul M.

AU - Forkman, Björn

AU - Haldane, Kirsty

AU - Kristensen, Helle Halkjær

AU - Palmer, Clare

PY - 2014/12/1

Y1 - 2014/12/1

N2 - Animal ethicists have recently debated the ethical questions raised by disenhancing animals to improve their welfare. Here, we focus on the particular case of breeding blind hens for commercial egg-laying systems, in order to benefit their welfare. Many people find breeding blind hens intuitively repellent, yet 'welfare-only' positions appear to be committed to endorsing this possibility if it produces welfare gains. We call this the 'Blind Hens' Challenge'. In this paper, we argue that there are both empirical and theoretical reasons why even those adopting 'welfare-only' views should be concerned about breeding blind hens. But we also argue that alternative views, which (for example) claim that it is important to respect the telos or rights of an animal, do not offer a more convincing solution to questions raised by the possibility of disenhancing animals for their own benefit.

AB - Animal ethicists have recently debated the ethical questions raised by disenhancing animals to improve their welfare. Here, we focus on the particular case of breeding blind hens for commercial egg-laying systems, in order to benefit their welfare. Many people find breeding blind hens intuitively repellent, yet 'welfare-only' positions appear to be committed to endorsing this possibility if it produces welfare gains. We call this the 'Blind Hens' Challenge'. In this paper, we argue that there are both empirical and theoretical reasons why even those adopting 'welfare-only' views should be concerned about breeding blind hens. But we also argue that alternative views, which (for example) claim that it is important to respect the telos or rights of an animal, do not offer a more convincing solution to questions raised by the possibility of disenhancing animals for their own benefit.

U2 - 10.3197/096327114x13947900181950

DO - 10.3197/096327114x13947900181950

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0963-2719

VL - 23

SP - 727

EP - 742

JO - Environmental Values

JF - Environmental Values

IS - 6

ER -

The blind hens’ challenge: does it undermine the view that only welfare matters in our dealings with animals?

Abstract

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this