Abstract
In this paper we formulate and analyze a simple dynamic model of the interaction between terrorists and authorities. Our primary aim is to analyze how the introduction of a so called copycat effect influences behavior and outcomes. We first show that our simple model of terrorist cells implies that an increase in anti-terrorism makes it more likely that cells will plan small rather than large attacks. Furthermore, we see that an increase in anti-terrorism can make a terrorist attack more likely. Analyzing the problem of optimal anti-terrorism we see that the introduction of a copycat effect rationalizes an increase in the level of anti-terrorism after a large attack. Using this result we show how the copycat effect changes the dynamic pattern of terrorism attacks and what the long run consequences are
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Publication status | Published - 2007 |
Keywords
- Faculty of Social Sciences
- terrorist cells
- optimal anti-terrorism
- copycat effect
