Shame and the Internalized Other

Alba Montes Sanchez

Shame and the Internalized Other

Department of Communication

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In Shame and Necessity, Bernard Williams engages in a forceful vindication of the ethical significance of shame. In his view, shame is an extremely productive moral emotion because of the distinctive connection that it establishes between self, others and world, through a self-evaluation that is mediated by an internalized other. In this paper, I examine Williams’ conception of the internalized other and contrast it with other ways of conceiving the role of others in shame. I argue that, although Williams’ views contain many important insights, much is to be gained by conceiving the role of others in Sartrean terms instead. The other’s perspective is not merely internalized; it is constitutive of the kind of selfhood that has a capacity for shame.

Original language	English
Journal	Etica e Politica / Ethics and Politics
Volume	XVII
Issue number	1
Pages (from-to)	181-200
Number of pages	20
ISSN	1825-5167
Publication status	Published - 2015

Keywords

Faculty of Humanities
shame
internalized other
moral emotions
Bernard Williams
Jean-Paul Sartre

Access to Document

http://www2.units.it/etica/2015_2/EP_2015_2.pdfLicence: CC BY-NC-SA

Cite this

@article{cf0024ab0a9547a5a6599988f8ab43e7,

title = "Shame and the Internalized Other",

abstract = "In Shame and Necessity, Bernard Williams engages in a forceful vindication of the ethical significance of shame. In his view, shame is an extremely productive moral emotion because of the distinctive connection that it establishes between self, others and world, through a self-evaluation that is mediated by an internalized other. In this paper, I examine Williams{\textquoteright} conception of the internalized other and contrast it with other ways of conceiving the role of others in shame. I argue that, although Williams{\textquoteright} views contain many important insights, much is to be gained by conceiving the role of others in Sartrean terms instead. The other{\textquoteright}s perspective is not merely internalized; it is constitutive of the kind of selfhood that has a capacity for shame.",

keywords = "Faculty of Humanities, shame, internalized other, moral emotions, Bernard Williams, Jean-Paul Sartre",

author = "{Montes Sanchez}, Alba",

year = "2015",

language = "English",

volume = "XVII",

pages = "181--200",

journal = "Etica e Politica / Ethics and Politics",

issn = "1825-5167",

publisher = "Universita degli Studi di Trieste * Edizioni Universita di Trieste (E U T)",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Shame and the Internalized Other

AU - Montes Sanchez, Alba

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - In Shame and Necessity, Bernard Williams engages in a forceful vindication of the ethical significance of shame. In his view, shame is an extremely productive moral emotion because of the distinctive connection that it establishes between self, others and world, through a self-evaluation that is mediated by an internalized other. In this paper, I examine Williams’ conception of the internalized other and contrast it with other ways of conceiving the role of others in shame. I argue that, although Williams’ views contain many important insights, much is to be gained by conceiving the role of others in Sartrean terms instead. The other’s perspective is not merely internalized; it is constitutive of the kind of selfhood that has a capacity for shame.

AB - In Shame and Necessity, Bernard Williams engages in a forceful vindication of the ethical significance of shame. In his view, shame is an extremely productive moral emotion because of the distinctive connection that it establishes between self, others and world, through a self-evaluation that is mediated by an internalized other. In this paper, I examine Williams’ conception of the internalized other and contrast it with other ways of conceiving the role of others in shame. I argue that, although Williams’ views contain many important insights, much is to be gained by conceiving the role of others in Sartrean terms instead. The other’s perspective is not merely internalized; it is constitutive of the kind of selfhood that has a capacity for shame.

KW - Faculty of Humanities

KW - shame

KW - internalized other

KW - moral emotions

KW - Bernard Williams

KW - Jean-Paul Sartre

M3 - Journal article

SN - 1825-5167

VL - XVII

SP - 181

EP - 200

JO - Etica e Politica / Ethics and Politics

JF - Etica e Politica / Ethics and Politics

IS - 1

ER -

Shame and the Internalized Other

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this