Abstract
We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a largescale online Public Goods Game and nd that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types.
This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game and is not driven by free riders lacking cognitive ability, confusion, or natural swiftness in responding. Our results suggest that conditional cooperation serves as a norm and that free riders
need time to resolve a moral dilemma
This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game and is not driven by free riders lacking cognitive ability, confusion, or natural swiftness in responding. Our results suggest that conditional cooperation serves as a norm and that free riders
need time to resolve a moral dilemma
Original language | English |
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Place of Publication | Lund |
Publisher | Department of Economics, Lund University |
Number of pages | 26 |
Publication status | Published - 2013 |
Series | Working Paper Department of Economics, Lund University |
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Number | 29 |
Volume | 2013 |
Keywords
- Faculty of Social Sciences
- Response Time
- Free Riding;
- Public Goods
- Experiment