Second-person engagement, self-alienation, and group-identification

Dan Zahavi

doi:10.1007/s11245-016-9444-6

Second-person engagement, self-alienation, and group-identification

Dan Zahavi

Department of Communication

21 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

One of the central questions within contemporary debates about collective intentionality concerns the notion and status of the we. The question, however, is by no means new. At the beginning of the last century, it was already intensively discussed in phenomenology. Whereas Heidegger argued that a focus on empathy is detrimental to a proper understanding of the we, and that the latter is more fundamental than any dyadic interaction, other phenomenologists, such as Stein, Walther and Husserl, insisted on the importance of empathy for proper we-experiences. In this paper, I will present some of the key moves in this debate and then discuss and assess Husserl’s specific proposal, according to which reciprocal empathy, second-person engagement and self-alienation are all important presuppositions for group-identification and we-identity.

Original language	English
Journal	Topoi
Volume	38
Issue number	1
Pages (from-to)	251-260
Number of pages	10
ISSN	0167-7411
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-016-9444-6
Publication status	Published - 15 Mar 2019

Keywords

Faculty of Humanities
Reciprocal empathy
Phenomenology
We-identity
Collective intentionality
Group-identification
Second-person engagement
Recognition

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10.1007/s11245-016-9444-6

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AB - One of the central questions within contemporary debates about collective intentionality concerns the notion and status of the we. The question, however, is by no means new. At the beginning of the last century, it was already intensively discussed in phenomenology. Whereas Heidegger argued that a focus on empathy is detrimental to a proper understanding of the we, and that the latter is more fundamental than any dyadic interaction, other phenomenologists, such as Stein, Walther and Husserl, insisted on the importance of empathy for proper we-experiences. In this paper, I will present some of the key moves in this debate and then discuss and assess Husserl’s specific proposal, according to which reciprocal empathy, second-person engagement and self-alienation are all important presuppositions for group-identification and we-identity.

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KW - Reciprocal empathy

KW - Phenomenology

KW - We-identity

KW - Collective intentionality

KW - Group-identification

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KW - Recognition

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JO - Topoi

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Second-person engagement, self-alienation, and group-identification

Abstract

Keywords

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