Regulating groundwater use in developing countries: a feasible instrument for public intervention

TY - JOUR

T1 - Regulating groundwater use in developing countries

T2 - a feasible instrument for public intervention

AU - Hansen, Lars Gårn

AU - Jensen, Frank

AU - Amundsen, Eirik S

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - Worldwide groundwater is a common-pool resource that is potentially subject to the tragedy of the commons if water extraction is not adequately regulated. In developing countries the regulatory infrastructure is often too weak to allow detailed monitoring of individual groundwater extraction. For this reason, classical public intervention instruments, such as consumption fees or tradable quotas, are infeasible. Here we present a theoretical foundation for a new public regulatory instrument that can potentially generate the same efficiency-inducing incentives as fees and tradable quotas, but without their information and monitoring requirements.

AB - Worldwide groundwater is a common-pool resource that is potentially subject to the tragedy of the commons if water extraction is not adequately regulated. In developing countries the regulatory infrastructure is often too weak to allow detailed monitoring of individual groundwater extraction. For this reason, classical public intervention instruments, such as consumption fees or tradable quotas, are infeasible. Here we present a theoretical foundation for a new public regulatory instrument that can potentially generate the same efficiency-inducing incentives as fees and tradable quotas, but without their information and monitoring requirements.

U2 - 10.1628/093245614X13867465880983

DO - 10.1628/093245614X13867465880983

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0932-4569

VL - 170

SP - 317

EP - 335

JO - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

JF - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

IS - 2

ER -