Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes

Louis Putterman; Jean-Robert Karl Tyran; Kenju  Kamei

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.001

Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes

Louis Putterman, Jean-Robert Karl Tyran, Kenju Kamei

Department of Economics

77 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support the provision of public goods has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable of either resolving or exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. We find that cooperative orientation, political attitude, gender and intelligence have a small but sometimes significant influence on voting.

Original language	English
Journal	Journal of Public Economics
Volume	95
Issue number	9-10
Pages (from-to)	1213–1222
ISSN	0047-2727
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.001
Publication status	Published - Oct 2011

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10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.001

Cite this

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title = "Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes",

abstract = "The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support the provision of public goods has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable of either resolving or exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. We find that cooperative orientation, political attitude, gender and intelligence have a small but sometimes significant influence on voting.",

author = "Louis Putterman and Tyran, {Jean-Robert Karl} and Kenju Kamei",

note = "JEL classification: C91; C92; D71; D72; H41 ",

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N2 - The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support the provision of public goods has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable of either resolving or exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. We find that cooperative orientation, political attitude, gender and intelligence have a small but sometimes significant influence on voting.

AB - The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support the provision of public goods has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable of either resolving or exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. We find that cooperative orientation, political attitude, gender and intelligence have a small but sometimes significant influence on voting.

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DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.001

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