Praetorius, N. (2007) The Problems of Consciousness and Content in Theories of Perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6:349-367

TY - JOUR

T1 - Praetorius, N. (2007) The Problems of Consciousness and Content in Theories of Perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6:349-367

AU - Praetorius, Nini

PY - 2007

Y1 - 2007

N2 - The paper aims to show, first, that O’Regan’s and Noë’s SensorimotorTheory of Vision and Visual Experiences suffers from circularity, and that evidencefrom empirical research within perception psychology unequivocally invalidatestheir theory. Secondly, to show that the circularity in O’Regan’s and Noë’s theory ofvision and in other general causal and functional theories of perception (i.e. Gibson’sand Marr’s theories of perception) is the inevitable consequence of mutuallyconflicting assumption of Cartesian dualism underlying these theories. The paperconcludes by outlining the consequences of this conflict of assumptions forpsychological theories of perception.

AB - The paper aims to show, first, that O’Regan’s and Noë’s SensorimotorTheory of Vision and Visual Experiences suffers from circularity, and that evidencefrom empirical research within perception psychology unequivocally invalidatestheir theory. Secondly, to show that the circularity in O’Regan’s and Noë’s theory ofvision and in other general causal and functional theories of perception (i.e. Gibson’sand Marr’s theories of perception) is the inevitable consequence of mutuallyconflicting assumption of Cartesian dualism underlying these theories. The paperconcludes by outlining the consequences of this conflict of assumptions forpsychological theories of perception.

KW - Faculty of Humanities

KW - sensorimotor theory of vision.enactive perception.dualism.Noë.O’Regan

M3 - Journal article

SN - 1568-7759

VL - 6

SP - 349

EP - 367

JO - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

JF - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

ER -