Praetorius, N. (2002b) Basic Conditions for Knowledge and Description of Real Things vs. Fictional Entities. Psycoloquy, 13(022).

    Abstract

    In his review, Hutto suggests that meaningful and true claims about "fictional entities", and entities which in retrospect prove to be "fictional", seem to question the generality of "the principle of the correctness of knowledge and language". By sorting out some misunderstandings of the "Correctness Principle", and clarifying the conditions for description and knowledge of "real" vs. "fictional" entities, I hope to show that the Correctness Principle does indeed apply to knowledge and description of both "real" and "fictional" entities.
    Original languageEnglish
    JournalPsycoloquy (Online)
    Volume13
    Issue number022
    Publication statusPublished - 2002

    Keywords

    • Faculty of Humanities
    • Cognition, Language, Reality, Facts, Fictional Entities, Conventions, Truth, History of Science, Scientific Theorising.

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