Political and judicial checks on corruption: evidence from American state governments

James E. Alt; David Dreyer Lassen

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00319.x

Political and judicial checks on corruption: evidence from American state governments

James E. Alt, David Dreyer Lassen

Department of Economics

55 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of checks and balances on corruption. Within a presidential system, effective separation of powers is achieved under a divided government, with the executive and legislative branches being controlled by different political parties. When government is unified, no effective separation exists even within a presidential system, but, we argue, can be partially restored by having an accountable judiciary. Our empirical findings show that a divided government and elected, rather than appointed, state supreme court judges are associated with lower corruption and, furthermore, that the effect of an accountable judiciary is stronger under a unified government, where the government cannot control itself.

Original language	English
Journal	Economics & Politics
Volume	20
Issue number	1
Pages (from-to)	33-61
Number of pages	28
ISSN	0954-1985
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00319.x
Publication status	Published - 2008

Keywords

Faculty of Social Sciences
corruption
political institutions
separation of powers

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00319.x

Cite this

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KW - magtens tredeling

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Political and judicial checks on corruption: evidence from American state governments

Abstract

Keywords

UN SDGs

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