Peer Effects in Legislative Voting

Nikolaj Harmon; Raymond Fisman; Emir Kamenica

doi:10.1257/app.20180286

Peer Effects in Legislative Voting

Nikolaj Harmon, Raymond Fisman, Emir Kamenica

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We exploit seating rules in the European Parliament to identify peer effects in legislative voting. Sitting adjacently leads to a 7 percent reduction in the overall likelihood that two members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the same party differ in their vote. Peer effects are markedly stronger among pairs of women, MEP pairs from the same country, and in close votes. Using variation in seating across the parliament's two venues (Brussels and Strasbourg), we show that peer effects are persistent: MEPs who have sat together in the past disagree less even when they are not seated adjacently.

Original language	English
Journal	American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
Volume	11
Issue number	4
Pages (from-to)	156-180
ISSN	1945-7782
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20180286
Publication status	Published - 1 Oct 2019

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10.1257/app.20180286

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abstract = "We exploit seating rules in the European Parliament to identify peer effects in legislative voting. Sitting adjacently leads to a 7 percent reduction in the overall likelihood that two members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the same party differ in their vote. Peer effects are markedly stronger among pairs of women, MEP pairs from the same country, and in close votes. Using variation in seating across the parliament's two venues (Brussels and Strasbourg), we show that peer effects are persistent: MEPs who have sat together in the past disagree less even when they are not seated adjacently. ",

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DO - 10.1257/app.20180286

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Peer Effects in Legislative Voting

Abstract

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