Optimal Monetary Policy Cooperation through State-Independent Contracts with Targets

Henrik Jensen

doi:10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00086-5

Optimal Monetary Policy Cooperation through State-Independent Contracts with Targets

Henrik Jensen

Department of Economics

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Simple state-independent monetary institutions are shown to secure optimal cooperative policies in a stochastic, linear-quadratic two-country world with international policy spill-overs and national credibility problems. Institutions characterize delegation to independent central bankers facing quadratic performance related contracts punishing or rewarding deviations from primary and intermediate policy targets

Original language	English
Journal	European Economic Review
Volume	44
Issue number	3
Pages (from-to)	517-539
ISSN	0014-2921
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00086-5
Publication status	Published - 2000

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title = "Optimal Monetary Policy Cooperation through State-Independent Contracts with Targets",

abstract = "Simple state-independent monetary institutions are shown to secure optimal cooperative policies in a stochastic, linear-quadratic two-country world with international policy spill-overs and national credibility problems. Institutions characterize delegation to independent central bankers facing quadratic performance related contracts punishing or rewarding deviations from primary and intermediate policy targets",

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AB - Simple state-independent monetary institutions are shown to secure optimal cooperative policies in a stochastic, linear-quadratic two-country world with international policy spill-overs and national credibility problems. Institutions characterize delegation to independent central bankers facing quadratic performance related contracts punishing or rewarding deviations from primary and intermediate policy targets

U2 - 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00086-5

DO - 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00086-5

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0014-2921

VL - 44

SP - 517

EP - 539

JO - European Economic Review

JF - European Economic Review

IS - 3

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Optimal Monetary Policy Cooperation through State-Independent Contracts with Targets

Abstract

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