National Responses to Transnational Terrorism: Intelligence and Counterterrorism Provision

Thomas Jensen

doi:10.1177/0022002714545221

National Responses to Transnational Terrorism: Intelligence and Counterterrorism Provision

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Intelligence about transnational terrorism is generally gathered by national agencies. I set up and analyze a game-theoretic model to study the implications of national intelligence gathering for the provision of domestic (defensive) counterterrorism when two countries are facing a common transnational terrorist threat. It is shown that, relative to a benchmark case where all intelligence is known by both countries, national intelligence gathering often leads to increased inefficiencies in counterterrorism provision. By extending the main model with a communication stage, I also explore whether the differences in information that may follow from national intelligence gathering will be overcome by intelligence sharing. If verifiable sharing is a viable option for each country, then full credible intelligence sharing can happen in equilibrium. On the other hand, if only cheap talk communication is possible, then it cannot.

Original language	English
Journal	Journal of Conflict Resolution
Number of pages	25
ISSN	0022-0027
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002714545221
Publication status	Published - Apr 2014

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

Access to Document

10.1177/0022002714545221

Cite this

@article{39b7187c758943e085c898812de2f943,

title = "National Responses to Transnational Terrorism: Intelligence and Counterterrorism Provision",

abstract = "Intelligence about transnational terrorism is generally gathered by national agencies. I set up and analyze a game-theoretic model to study the implications of national intelligence gathering for the provision of domestic (defensive) counterterrorism when two countries are facing a common transnational terrorist threat. It is shown that, relative to a benchmark case where all intelligence is known by both countries, national intelligence gathering often leads to increased inefficiencies in counterterrorism provision. By extending the main model with a communication stage, I also explore whether the differences in information that may follow from national intelligence gathering will be overcome by intelligence sharing. If verifiable sharing is a viable option for each country, then full credible intelligence sharing can happen in equilibrium. On the other hand, if only cheap talk communication is possible, then it cannot.",

author = "Thomas Jensen",

year = "2014",

month = apr,

doi = "10.1177/0022002714545221",

language = "English",

journal = "Journal of Conflict Resolution",

issn = "0022-0027",

publisher = "SAGE Publications",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - National Responses to Transnational Terrorism

T2 - Intelligence and Counterterrorism Provision

AU - Jensen, Thomas

PY - 2014/4

Y1 - 2014/4

N2 - Intelligence about transnational terrorism is generally gathered by national agencies. I set up and analyze a game-theoretic model to study the implications of national intelligence gathering for the provision of domestic (defensive) counterterrorism when two countries are facing a common transnational terrorist threat. It is shown that, relative to a benchmark case where all intelligence is known by both countries, national intelligence gathering often leads to increased inefficiencies in counterterrorism provision. By extending the main model with a communication stage, I also explore whether the differences in information that may follow from national intelligence gathering will be overcome by intelligence sharing. If verifiable sharing is a viable option for each country, then full credible intelligence sharing can happen in equilibrium. On the other hand, if only cheap talk communication is possible, then it cannot.

AB - Intelligence about transnational terrorism is generally gathered by national agencies. I set up and analyze a game-theoretic model to study the implications of national intelligence gathering for the provision of domestic (defensive) counterterrorism when two countries are facing a common transnational terrorist threat. It is shown that, relative to a benchmark case where all intelligence is known by both countries, national intelligence gathering often leads to increased inefficiencies in counterterrorism provision. By extending the main model with a communication stage, I also explore whether the differences in information that may follow from national intelligence gathering will be overcome by intelligence sharing. If verifiable sharing is a viable option for each country, then full credible intelligence sharing can happen in equilibrium. On the other hand, if only cheap talk communication is possible, then it cannot.

U2 - 10.1177/0022002714545221

DO - 10.1177/0022002714545221

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0022-0027

JO - Journal of Conflict Resolution

JF - Journal of Conflict Resolution

ER -

National Responses to Transnational Terrorism: Intelligence and Counterterrorism Provision

Abstract

UN SDGs

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this