McNeill on Embodied Perception Theory

TY - JOUR

T1 - McNeill on Embodied Perception Theory

AU - Overgaard, Søren

PY - 2014/1

Y1 - 2014/1

N2 - Advocates of the perceptual hypothesis maintain that we can sometimes perceive others' mental features, and thereby acquire non-inferential knowledge about them. The embodied perception theory states that the perceptual hypothesis is plausible if, but only if, some mental states are embodied. In a recent paper, W. E. S. McNeill argues that embodied perception theory is false. I argue that McNeill's objections are inconclusive.

AB - Advocates of the perceptual hypothesis maintain that we can sometimes perceive others' mental features, and thereby acquire non-inferential knowledge about them. The embodied perception theory states that the perceptual hypothesis is plausible if, but only if, some mental states are embodied. In a recent paper, W. E. S. McNeill argues that embodied perception theory is false. I argue that McNeill's objections are inconclusive.

U2 - 10.1093/pq/pqt020

DO - 10.1093/pq/pqt020

M3 - Comment/debate

SN - 0031-8094

VL - 64

SP - 135

EP - 143

JO - Philosophical Quarterly

JF - Philosophical Quarterly

IS - 254

ER -