Lobbying in the EU Comitology System

Rikke Wetendorff Nørgaard; Peter Nedergaard; Jens Blom-Hansen

doi:10.1080/07036337.2014.889128

Lobbying in the EU Comitology System

Rikke Wetendorff Nørgaard, Peter Nedergaard, Jens Blom-Hansen

Centre for European Politics

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Comitology is an important part of the EU’s regulatory framework. Hence, lobbying by outside interests is to be expected. However, lobbying in the comitology system has received almost no scholarly attention. This paper provides the first understanding of the subject by analysing the access of business interests to actors in the comitology system. The analysis is designed as a most likely study of two cases, aviation safety and CO2 quotas. Based on Bouwen’s rationalist theory of access goods, the empirical analysis shows that lobbying is prevalent, especially by sectoral interests providing expert knowledge and targeted mainly at the Commission, but also at the member states in the comitology committees, and the European Parliament. The case studies therefore indicate that lobbying is widespread in the comitology system and important to study in order to understand the outputs from this part of the EU political system.

Translated title of the contribution	Lobbyisme i EU's Komitologisystem
Original language	English
Article number	4
Journal	Journal of European Integration
Volume	36
Issue number	5
Pages (from-to)	491-507
Number of pages	16
ISSN	0703-6367
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2014.889128
Publication status	Published - Jul 2014

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title = "Lobbying in the EU Comitology System",

abstract = "Comitology is an important part of the EU{\textquoteright}s regulatory framework. Hence, lobbying by outside interests is to be expected. However, lobbying in the comitology system has received almost no scholarly attention. This paper provides the first understanding of the subject by analysing the access of business interests to actors in the comitology system. The analysis is designed as a most likely study of two cases, aviation safety and CO2 quotas. Based on Bouwen{\textquoteright}s rationalist theory of access goods, the empirical analysis shows that lobbying is prevalent, especially by sectoral interests providing expert knowledge and targeted mainly at the Commission, but also at the member states in the comitology committees, and the European Parliament. The case studies therefore indicate that lobbying is widespread in the comitology system and important to study in order to understand the outputs from this part of the EU political system.",

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T1 - Lobbying in the EU Comitology System

AU - Nørgaard, Rikke Wetendorff

AU - Nedergaard, Peter

AU - Blom-Hansen, Jens

PY - 2014/7

Y1 - 2014/7

N2 - Comitology is an important part of the EU’s regulatory framework. Hence, lobbying by outside interests is to be expected. However, lobbying in the comitology system has received almost no scholarly attention. This paper provides the first understanding of the subject by analysing the access of business interests to actors in the comitology system. The analysis is designed as a most likely study of two cases, aviation safety and CO2 quotas. Based on Bouwen’s rationalist theory of access goods, the empirical analysis shows that lobbying is prevalent, especially by sectoral interests providing expert knowledge and targeted mainly at the Commission, but also at the member states in the comitology committees, and the European Parliament. The case studies therefore indicate that lobbying is widespread in the comitology system and important to study in order to understand the outputs from this part of the EU political system.

AB - Comitology is an important part of the EU’s regulatory framework. Hence, lobbying by outside interests is to be expected. However, lobbying in the comitology system has received almost no scholarly attention. This paper provides the first understanding of the subject by analysing the access of business interests to actors in the comitology system. The analysis is designed as a most likely study of two cases, aviation safety and CO2 quotas. Based on Bouwen’s rationalist theory of access goods, the empirical analysis shows that lobbying is prevalent, especially by sectoral interests providing expert knowledge and targeted mainly at the Commission, but also at the member states in the comitology committees, and the European Parliament. The case studies therefore indicate that lobbying is widespread in the comitology system and important to study in order to understand the outputs from this part of the EU political system.

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ER -

Lobbying in the EU Comitology System

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