Let the Experts Decide?: Asymmetric Information, Abstention, and Coordination in Standing Committees

Rebecca Morton; Jean-Robert Tyran

Let the Experts Decide? Asymmetric Information, Abstention, and Coordination in Standing Committees

Department of Economics

287 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We examine abstention when voters in standing committees are asymmetrically informed and there are multiple pure strategy equilibria-swing voter's curse (SVC) equilibria where voters with low quality information abstain and equilibria when all participants vote their information. When the asymmetry in information quality is large, we find that voting groups largely coordinate on the SVC equilibrium which is also Pareto Optimal. However, we find that when the asymmetry in information quality is not large and the Pareto Optimal equilibrium is for all to participate, significant numbers of voters with low quality information abstain. Furthermore, we find that information asymmetry induces voters with low quality information to coordinate on a non-equilibrium outcome. This suggests that coordination on "letting the experts" decide is a likely voting norm that sometimes validates SVC equilibrium predictions but other times does not.

Original language	English
Publisher	Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen
Number of pages	43
Publication status	Published - 2008

Access to Document

DP 08-25Final published version, 301 KB

Cite this

@techreport{260ea800abe811ddb5e9000ea68e967b,

title = "Let the Experts Decide?: Asymmetric Information, Abstention, and Coordination in Standing Committees",

abstract = "We examine abstention when voters in standing committees are asymmetrically informed and there are multiple pure strategy equilibria-swing voter's curse (SVC) equilibria where voters with low quality information abstain and equilibria when all participants vote their information. When the asymmetry in information quality is large, we find that voting groups largely coordinate on the SVC equilibrium which is also Pareto Optimal. However, we find that when the asymmetry in information quality is not large and the Pareto Optimal equilibrium is for all to participate, significant numbers of voters with low quality information abstain. Furthermore, we find that information asymmetry induces voters with low quality information to coordinate on a non-equilibrium outcome. This suggests that coordination on {"}letting the experts{"} decide is a likely voting norm that sometimes validates SVC equilibrium predictions but other times does not.",

author = "Rebecca Morton and Jean-Robert Tyran",

year = "2008",

language = "English",

publisher = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",

address = "Denmark",

type = "WorkingPaper",

institution = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",

}

TY - UNPB

T1 - Let the Experts Decide?

T2 - Asymmetric Information, Abstention, and Coordination in Standing Committees

AU - Morton, Rebecca

AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - We examine abstention when voters in standing committees are asymmetrically informed and there are multiple pure strategy equilibria-swing voter's curse (SVC) equilibria where voters with low quality information abstain and equilibria when all participants vote their information. When the asymmetry in information quality is large, we find that voting groups largely coordinate on the SVC equilibrium which is also Pareto Optimal. However, we find that when the asymmetry in information quality is not large and the Pareto Optimal equilibrium is for all to participate, significant numbers of voters with low quality information abstain. Furthermore, we find that information asymmetry induces voters with low quality information to coordinate on a non-equilibrium outcome. This suggests that coordination on "letting the experts" decide is a likely voting norm that sometimes validates SVC equilibrium predictions but other times does not.

AB - We examine abstention when voters in standing committees are asymmetrically informed and there are multiple pure strategy equilibria-swing voter's curse (SVC) equilibria where voters with low quality information abstain and equilibria when all participants vote their information. When the asymmetry in information quality is large, we find that voting groups largely coordinate on the SVC equilibrium which is also Pareto Optimal. However, we find that when the asymmetry in information quality is not large and the Pareto Optimal equilibrium is for all to participate, significant numbers of voters with low quality information abstain. Furthermore, we find that information asymmetry induces voters with low quality information to coordinate on a non-equilibrium outcome. This suggests that coordination on "letting the experts" decide is a likely voting norm that sometimes validates SVC equilibrium predictions but other times does not.

M3 - Working paper

BT - Let the Experts Decide?

PB - Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen

ER -

Let the Experts Decide? Asymmetric Information, Abstention, and Coordination in Standing Committees

Abstract

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this