Legislative amendments and informal politics in the European Union: A text reuse approach

James P. Cross; Henrik Hermansson

doi:10.1177/1465116517717071

Legislative amendments and informal politics in the European Union: A text reuse approach

James P. Cross^*, Henrik Hermansson

^*Corresponding author for this work

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The ability to amend legislative proposals introduced by the Commission is central to legislative process in the European Union. Despite this, very few attempts have been made to capture and explain such amendments. This study addresses this gap in the literature by considering the changes between the Commission’s proposals and the final legislative outcome passed by the European Union. It does so by implementing minimum edit distance algorithms to measure changes between legislative proposals and outcomes. The findings suggest that legislative amendments are determined by the formal and informal institutional structures in which negotiations take place and characteristics of the proposal itself. Our conclusions contribute to the ongoing debate on the nature and distribution of legislative powers in the European Union.

Original language	English
Journal	European Union Politics
Volume	18
Issue number	4
Pages (from-to)	581-602
Number of pages	22
ISSN	1465-1165
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116517717071
Publication status	Published - 2017

Keywords

Bargaining
co-decision
informal politics
legislative studies
quantitative text analysis

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abstract = "The ability to amend legislative proposals introduced by the Commission is central to legislative process in the European Union. Despite this, very few attempts have been made to capture and explain such amendments. This study addresses this gap in the literature by considering the changes between the Commission{\textquoteright}s proposals and the final legislative outcome passed by the European Union. It does so by implementing minimum edit distance algorithms to measure changes between legislative proposals and outcomes. The findings suggest that legislative amendments are determined by the formal and informal institutional structures in which negotiations take place and characteristics of the proposal itself. Our conclusions contribute to the ongoing debate on the nature and distribution of legislative powers in the European Union.",

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AB - The ability to amend legislative proposals introduced by the Commission is central to legislative process in the European Union. Despite this, very few attempts have been made to capture and explain such amendments. This study addresses this gap in the literature by considering the changes between the Commission’s proposals and the final legislative outcome passed by the European Union. It does so by implementing minimum edit distance algorithms to measure changes between legislative proposals and outcomes. The findings suggest that legislative amendments are determined by the formal and informal institutional structures in which negotiations take place and characteristics of the proposal itself. Our conclusions contribute to the ongoing debate on the nature and distribution of legislative powers in the European Union.

KW - Bargaining

KW - co-decision

KW - informal politics

KW - legislative studies

KW - quantitative text analysis

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Legislative amendments and informal politics in the European Union: A text reuse approach

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Keywords

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