Learning, tracing, and risk dominance

Ebbe Hendon; Hans Jørgen Jacobsen; Michael Teit Nielsen; Birgitte Sloth

doi:10.1006/game.1994.1055

Learning, tracing, and risk dominance

Ebbe Hendon, Hans Jørgen Jacobsen, Michael Teit Nielsen, Birgitte Sloth

Department of Economics

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper presents a learning process which is a generalization of the method of fictitious play of Brown. If the learning process converges, the convergence point is a Nash equilibrium. We study 2 × 2 games. Here the process always converges. The relation between the initial prior, the weight assigned to this prior, and the equilibrium selected is examined. As the weight increases, the relation between the prior and the equilibrium selected becomes almost identical to that of the tracing procedure of Harsanyi. In this way the learning process supports the concept of risk dominance of Harsanyi and Selten

Original language	English
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	7
Issue number	3
Pages (from-to)	332-345
ISSN	0899-8256
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1055
Publication status	Published - 1994

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10.1006/game.1994.1055

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title = "Learning, tracing, and risk dominance",

abstract = "This paper presents a learning process which is a generalization of the method of fictitious play of Brown. If the learning process converges, the convergence point is a Nash equilibrium. We study 2 × 2 games. Here the process always converges. The relation between the initial prior, the weight assigned to this prior, and the equilibrium selected is examined. As the weight increases, the relation between the prior and the equilibrium selected becomes almost identical to that of the tracing procedure of Harsanyi. In this way the learning process supports the concept of risk dominance of Harsanyi and Selten",

author = "Ebbe Hendon and Jacobsen, {Hans J{\o}rgen} and Nielsen, {Michael Teit} and Birgitte Sloth",

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AU - Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen

AU - Nielsen, Michael Teit

AU - Sloth, Birgitte

N1 - JEL Classification: C72

PY - 1994

Y1 - 1994

N2 - This paper presents a learning process which is a generalization of the method of fictitious play of Brown. If the learning process converges, the convergence point is a Nash equilibrium. We study 2 × 2 games. Here the process always converges. The relation between the initial prior, the weight assigned to this prior, and the equilibrium selected is examined. As the weight increases, the relation between the prior and the equilibrium selected becomes almost identical to that of the tracing procedure of Harsanyi. In this way the learning process supports the concept of risk dominance of Harsanyi and Selten

AB - This paper presents a learning process which is a generalization of the method of fictitious play of Brown. If the learning process converges, the convergence point is a Nash equilibrium. We study 2 × 2 games. Here the process always converges. The relation between the initial prior, the weight assigned to this prior, and the equilibrium selected is examined. As the weight increases, the relation between the prior and the equilibrium selected becomes almost identical to that of the tracing procedure of Harsanyi. In this way the learning process supports the concept of risk dominance of Harsanyi and Selten

U2 - 10.1006/game.1994.1055

DO - 10.1006/game.1994.1055

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 7

SP - 332

EP - 345

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

IS - 3

ER -

Learning, tracing, and risk dominance

Abstract

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