Judicial error and cooperation

Thomas Markussen; Jean-Robert Karl Tyran; Louis Putterman

doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.08.004

Judicial error and cooperation

Thomas Markussen, Jean-Robert Karl Tyran, Louis Putterman

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Cooperation can be induced by an authority with the power to mete out sanctions for free riders, but law enforcement is prone to error. This paper experimentally analyzes preferences for and consequences of errors in formal sanctions against free riders in a public goods game. With type I errors, even full contributors to the public good may be punished. With type II errors, free riders may go unpunished. We find that judicial error undermines cooperation and that the effects of type I and II errors are symmetric. To investigate their relative (dis-)like for error, we let subjects choose what type of error to prevent. We find that subjects prefer type II over type I errors. However, the strength of preferences for preventing type I errors is fully in line with a motive to maximize income and does not indicate any additional psychological or fairness bias against type I errors.

Original language	English
Journal	European Economic Review
Volume	89
Pages (from-to)	372–388
ISSN	0014-2921
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.08.004
Publication status	Published - 1 Oct 2016

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title = "Judicial error and cooperation",

abstract = "Cooperation can be induced by an authority with the power to mete out sanctions for free riders, but law enforcement is prone to error. This paper experimentally analyzes preferences for and consequences of errors in formal sanctions against free riders in a public goods game. With type I errors, even full contributors to the public good may be punished. With type II errors, free riders may go unpunished. We find that judicial error undermines cooperation and that the effects of type I and II errors are symmetric. To investigate their relative (dis-)like for error, we let subjects choose what type of error to prevent. We find that subjects prefer type II over type I errors. However, the strength of preferences for preventing type I errors is fully in line with a motive to maximize income and does not indicate any additional psychological or fairness bias against type I errors.",

author = "Thomas Markussen and Tyran, {Jean-Robert Karl} and Louis Putterman",

note = "JEL classifications: H41; K4; C92",

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AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl

AU - Putterman, Louis

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PY - 2016/10/1

Y1 - 2016/10/1

N2 - Cooperation can be induced by an authority with the power to mete out sanctions for free riders, but law enforcement is prone to error. This paper experimentally analyzes preferences for and consequences of errors in formal sanctions against free riders in a public goods game. With type I errors, even full contributors to the public good may be punished. With type II errors, free riders may go unpunished. We find that judicial error undermines cooperation and that the effects of type I and II errors are symmetric. To investigate their relative (dis-)like for error, we let subjects choose what type of error to prevent. We find that subjects prefer type II over type I errors. However, the strength of preferences for preventing type I errors is fully in line with a motive to maximize income and does not indicate any additional psychological or fairness bias against type I errors.

AB - Cooperation can be induced by an authority with the power to mete out sanctions for free riders, but law enforcement is prone to error. This paper experimentally analyzes preferences for and consequences of errors in formal sanctions against free riders in a public goods game. With type I errors, even full contributors to the public good may be punished. With type II errors, free riders may go unpunished. We find that judicial error undermines cooperation and that the effects of type I and II errors are symmetric. To investigate their relative (dis-)like for error, we let subjects choose what type of error to prevent. We find that subjects prefer type II over type I errors. However, the strength of preferences for preventing type I errors is fully in line with a motive to maximize income and does not indicate any additional psychological or fairness bias against type I errors.

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DO - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.08.004

M3 - Journal article

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VL - 89

SP - 372

EP - 388

JO - European Economic Review

JF - European Economic Review

ER -

Judicial error and cooperation

Abstract

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