Interaction Sheaves on Continuous Domains

TY - UNPB

T1 - Interaction Sheaves on Continuous Domains

AU - Abdou, J.

AU - Keiding, Hans

N1 - JEL Classification: C70, D71

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - We introduce a description of the power structure which is inherent in a strategic game form using the concept of an interaction sheaf. The latter assigns to each open set of outcomes a set of interaction arrays, specifying the changes that coalitions can make if outcome belongs to this open set. The interaction sheaf generalizes the notion of effectivity functions which has been widely used in implementation theory, taking into consideration that changes in outcome may be sustained not only by single coalitions but possibly by several coalitions, depending on the underlying strategy choices. Also, it with not necessarily finite sets of outcomes, generalizing the results on solvability of game forms obtained in the finite case in Abdou and Keiding (2003)

AB - We introduce a description of the power structure which is inherent in a strategic game form using the concept of an interaction sheaf. The latter assigns to each open set of outcomes a set of interaction arrays, specifying the changes that coalitions can make if outcome belongs to this open set. The interaction sheaf generalizes the notion of effectivity functions which has been widely used in implementation theory, taking into consideration that changes in outcome may be sustained not only by single coalitions but possibly by several coalitions, depending on the underlying strategy choices. Also, it with not necessarily finite sets of outcomes, generalizing the results on solvability of game forms obtained in the finite case in Abdou and Keiding (2003)

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - strong equilibrium

KW - solvability

KW - effectivity

KW - acyclicity

M3 - Working paper

BT - Interaction Sheaves on Continuous Domains

PB - Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen

ER -