Inequality and Political Clientelism: Evidence from South India

TY - UNPB

T1 - Inequality and Political Clientelism

T2 - Evidence from South India

AU - Markussen, Thomas

N1 - JEL classification: D31, D72, H7, O1

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - Political parties can be vehicles for economic and social development in poor  countries. They can also serve as rent seeking instruments. Uncovering how parties function is therefore key to establishing the preconditions for good governance. The paper discusses when and why clientelism on the basis of party affiliation may arise. Operationally, party-based clientelism is defined as a bias of public policy in favour of members of the governing political party. In a sample of local governments in India, party-based clientelism is shown to exist in two out of four states and to be strongly affected by economic inequality.

AB - Political parties can be vehicles for economic and social development in poor  countries. They can also serve as rent seeking instruments. Uncovering how parties function is therefore key to establishing the preconditions for good governance. The paper discusses when and why clientelism on the basis of party affiliation may arise. Operationally, party-based clientelism is defined as a bias of public policy in favour of members of the governing political party. In a sample of local governments in India, party-based clientelism is shown to exist in two out of four states and to be strongly affected by economic inequality.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - fattigdom

KW - Indien

KW - decentralization

KW - patronage

KW - clientelism

KW - poverty

KW - India

M3 - Working paper

BT - Inequality and Political Clientelism

PB - Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen

ER -