Fictitious play in extensive form games

TY - JOUR

T1 - Fictitious play in extensive form games

AU - Hendon, Ebbe

AU - Whitta-Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen

AU - Sloth, Birgitte

N1 - JEL Classification: C72

PY - 1996

Y1 - 1996

N2 - This article analyzes the fictitious play process originally proposed for strategic form games by Brown (1951) and Robinson (1951). We interpret the process as a model of preplay thinking performed by players before acting in a one-shot game. This model is one of bounded rationality. We discuss how fictitious play should then be defined for extensive form games and conclude that this is somewhat problematic. We therefore study two alternative definitions. For either of these, under a weak condition of initial uncertainty, a convergence point of a fictitious play sequence is a sequential equilibrium. For generic games of perfect information initial uncertainty also implies convergence of fictitious play

AB - This article analyzes the fictitious play process originally proposed for strategic form games by Brown (1951) and Robinson (1951). We interpret the process as a model of preplay thinking performed by players before acting in a one-shot game. This model is one of bounded rationality. We discuss how fictitious play should then be defined for extensive form games and conclude that this is somewhat problematic. We therefore study two alternative definitions. For either of these, under a weak condition of initial uncertainty, a convergence point of a fictitious play sequence is a sequential equilibrium. For generic games of perfect information initial uncertainty also implies convergence of fictitious play

U2 - 10.1006/game.1996.0065

DO - 10.1006/game.1996.0065

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 15

SP - 177

EP - 202

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

IS - 2

ER -