n-person nonconvex bargaining: efficient proportional solutions

Jens Leth Hougaard; Mich Tvede

n-person nonconvex bargaining: efficient proportional solutions

Department of Economics

Abstract

For n-person bargaining problems the family of proportional solutions (introduced and characterized by Kalai) is generalized to bargaining problems with non-convex payoff sets. The so-called "efficient proportional solutions" are characterized axiomatically using natural extensions of the original axioms provided by Kalai.

Original language	English
Publisher	Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen
Number of pages	9
Publication status	Published - 2010

Keywords

Former LIFE faculty

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n-person nonconvex bargaining: efficient proportional solutions

Abstract

Keywords

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