Effort rights-based management

Dale  Squires; Mark  Maunder; Robin Allen; Peder Andersen; Kepa Astorkiza; Douglas Butterworth; Gonzalo Caballero; Raymond Clarke; Hans Ellefsen; Patrice Guillotreau; John Hampton; Rögnvaldur  Hannesson; Elizabeth Havice; Mark Helvey; Samuel  Herrick, Jr.; Kjartan Hoydal; Vishwanie Maharaj; Rebecca  Metzner; Iago Mosqueira; Ana Parma; Ivan Prieto-Bowen; Victor  Restrepo; Shaufique Fahmi Sidique; Stein Ivar Steinsham; Eric Thunberg; Ikerne del Valle; Niels Vestergård

doi:10.1111/faf.12185

Effort rights-based management

Dale Squires, Mark Maunder, Robin Allen, Peder Andersen, Kepa Astorkiza, Douglas Butterworth, Gonzalo Caballero, Raymond Clarke, Hans Ellefsen, Patrice Guillotreau, John Hampton, Rögnvaldur Hannesson, Elizabeth Havice, Mark Helvey, Samuel Herrick, Jr., Kjartan Hoydal, Vishwanie Maharaj, Rebecca Metzner, Iago Mosqueira, Ana ParmaIvan Prieto-Bowen, Victor Restrepo, Shaufique Fahmi Sidique, Stein Ivar Steinsham, Eric Thunberg, Ikerne del Valle, Niels Vestergård

Section for Environment and Natural Resources

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Effort rights-based fisheries management (RBM) is less widely used than catch rights, whether for groups or individuals. Because RBM on catch or effort necessarily requires a total allowable catch (TAC) or total allowable effort (TAE), RBM is discussed in conjunction with issues in assessing fish populations and providing TACs or TAEs. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and there are trade-offs between the two approaches. In a narrow economic sense, catch rights are superior because of the type of incentives created, but once the costs of research to improve stock assessments and the associated risks of determining the TAC and costs of monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement are taken into consideration, the choice between catch or effort RBM becomes more complex and less clear. The results will be case specific. Hybrid systems based on both catch and effort are increasingly employed to manage marine fisheries to capture the advantages of both approaches. In hybrid systems, catch or effort RBM dominates and controls on the other supplements. RBM using either catch or effort by itself addresses only the target species stock externality and not the remaining externalities associated with by-catch and the ecosystem.

Original language	English
Journal	Fish and Fisheries
Volume	18
Issue number	3
Pages (from-to)	440-465
Number of pages	26
ISSN	1467-2960
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/faf.12185
Publication status	Published - 2017

Keywords

Catch rights
effort rights
fisheries management
total allowable catch
total allowable effort

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

Access to Document

10.1111/faf.12185

Cite this

Squires, D., Maunder, M., Allen, R., Andersen, P., Astorkiza, K., Butterworth, D., Caballero, G., Clarke, R., Ellefsen, H., Guillotreau, P., Hampton, J., Hannesson, R., Havice, E., Helvey, M., Herrick, Jr., S., Hoydal, K., Maharaj, V., Metzner, R., Mosqueira, I., ... Vestergård, N. (2017). Effort rights-based management. Fish and Fisheries, 18(3), 440-465. https://doi.org/10.1111/faf.12185

Squires, D, Maunder, M, Allen, R, Andersen, P, Astorkiza, K, Butterworth, D, Caballero, G, Clarke, R, Ellefsen, H, Guillotreau, P, Hampton, J, Hannesson, R, Havice, E, Helvey, M, Herrick, Jr., S, Hoydal, K, Maharaj, V, Metzner, R, Mosqueira, I, Parma, A, Prieto-Bowen, I, Restrepo, V, Sidique, SF, Steinsham, SI, Thunberg, E, del Valle, I & Vestergård, N 2017, 'Effort rights-based management', Fish and Fisheries, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 440-465. https://doi.org/10.1111/faf.12185

@article{d23bb843733d47a6934a45b0c0a62c99,

title = "Effort rights-based management",

abstract = "Effort rights-based fisheries management (RBM) is less widely used than catch rights, whether for groups or individuals. Because RBM on catch or effort necessarily requires a total allowable catch (TAC) or total allowable effort (TAE), RBM is discussed in conjunction with issues in assessing fish populations and providing TACs or TAEs. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and there are trade-offs between the two approaches. In a narrow economic sense, catch rights are superior because of the type of incentives created, but once the costs of research to improve stock assessments and the associated risks of determining the TAC and costs of monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement are taken into consideration, the choice between catch or effort RBM becomes more complex and less clear. The results will be case specific. Hybrid systems based on both catch and effort are increasingly employed to manage marine fisheries to capture the advantages of both approaches. In hybrid systems, catch or effort RBM dominates and controls on the other supplements. RBM using either catch or effort by itself addresses only the target species stock externality and not the remaining externalities associated with by-catch and the ecosystem.",

keywords = "Catch rights, effort rights, fisheries management, total allowable catch, total allowable effort",

author = "Dale Squires and Mark Maunder and Robin Allen and Peder Andersen and Kepa Astorkiza and Douglas Butterworth and Gonzalo Caballero and Raymond Clarke and Hans Ellefsen and Patrice Guillotreau and John Hampton and R{\"o}gnvaldur Hannesson and Elizabeth Havice and Mark Helvey and {Herrick, Jr.}, Samuel and Kjartan Hoydal and Vishwanie Maharaj and Rebecca Metzner and Iago Mosqueira and Ana Parma and Ivan Prieto-Bowen and Victor Restrepo and Sidique, {Shaufique Fahmi} and Steinsham, {Stein Ivar} and Eric Thunberg and {del Valle}, Ikerne and Niels Vesterg{\aa}rd",

year = "2017",

doi = "10.1111/faf.12185",

language = "English",

volume = "18",

pages = "440--465",

journal = "Fish and Fisheries",

issn = "1467-2960",

publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",

number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Effort rights-based management

AU - Squires, Dale

AU - Maunder, Mark

AU - Allen, Robin

AU - Andersen, Peder

AU - Astorkiza, Kepa

AU - Butterworth, Douglas

AU - Caballero, Gonzalo

AU - Clarke, Raymond

AU - Ellefsen, Hans

AU - Guillotreau, Patrice

AU - Hampton, John

AU - Hannesson, Rögnvaldur

AU - Havice, Elizabeth

AU - Helvey, Mark

AU - Herrick, Jr., Samuel

AU - Hoydal, Kjartan

AU - Maharaj, Vishwanie

AU - Metzner, Rebecca

AU - Mosqueira, Iago

AU - Parma, Ana

AU - Prieto-Bowen, Ivan

AU - Restrepo, Victor

AU - Sidique, Shaufique Fahmi

AU - Steinsham, Stein Ivar

AU - Thunberg, Eric

AU - del Valle, Ikerne

AU - Vestergård, Niels

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - Effort rights-based fisheries management (RBM) is less widely used than catch rights, whether for groups or individuals. Because RBM on catch or effort necessarily requires a total allowable catch (TAC) or total allowable effort (TAE), RBM is discussed in conjunction with issues in assessing fish populations and providing TACs or TAEs. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and there are trade-offs between the two approaches. In a narrow economic sense, catch rights are superior because of the type of incentives created, but once the costs of research to improve stock assessments and the associated risks of determining the TAC and costs of monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement are taken into consideration, the choice between catch or effort RBM becomes more complex and less clear. The results will be case specific. Hybrid systems based on both catch and effort are increasingly employed to manage marine fisheries to capture the advantages of both approaches. In hybrid systems, catch or effort RBM dominates and controls on the other supplements. RBM using either catch or effort by itself addresses only the target species stock externality and not the remaining externalities associated with by-catch and the ecosystem.

AB - Effort rights-based fisheries management (RBM) is less widely used than catch rights, whether for groups or individuals. Because RBM on catch or effort necessarily requires a total allowable catch (TAC) or total allowable effort (TAE), RBM is discussed in conjunction with issues in assessing fish populations and providing TACs or TAEs. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and there are trade-offs between the two approaches. In a narrow economic sense, catch rights are superior because of the type of incentives created, but once the costs of research to improve stock assessments and the associated risks of determining the TAC and costs of monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement are taken into consideration, the choice between catch or effort RBM becomes more complex and less clear. The results will be case specific. Hybrid systems based on both catch and effort are increasingly employed to manage marine fisheries to capture the advantages of both approaches. In hybrid systems, catch or effort RBM dominates and controls on the other supplements. RBM using either catch or effort by itself addresses only the target species stock externality and not the remaining externalities associated with by-catch and the ecosystem.

KW - Catch rights

KW - effort rights

KW - fisheries management

KW - total allowable catch

KW - total allowable effort

U2 - 10.1111/faf.12185

DO - 10.1111/faf.12185

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:84995511075

SN - 1467-2960

VL - 18

SP - 440

EP - 465

JO - Fish and Fisheries

JF - Fish and Fisheries

IS - 3

ER -

Effort rights-based management

Abstract

Keywords

UN SDGs

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this