Abstract
In this paper I provide an analytical model for the rationale behind supermarket pricing patterns characterized by long-term high prices and temporary price reductions. The model is based on the understanding that temporary price reductions serve the role of price discrimination between consumers with different search costs and willingness to wait. I demonstrate that the high-price-low-price pattern is rational for storable goods. In a Markov-perfect equilibrium, agents’ actions depend on consumer inventory, and purchase decisions are characterized by a critical price. The equilibrium price series consists of one-time price reductions and several consecutive periods in which all retailers offer the regular price. The model predicts that competition is the hardest when consumer inventories are zero, and that at high inventory levels the probability of holding a sale is low.
| Original language | English |
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| Publication status | In preparation - 2014 |
Keywords
- Faculty of Social Sciences
- Price discrimination
- Storable goods
- Search
- Supermarket retailing