Democracy, redistributive taxation and the private provision of public goods

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The paper studies in a simple, Downsian model of political competition the private provision of public goods embedded in a system of democracy and redistributive taxation. Results show that the positive effect of inequality on production of public goods, to which Olson (1965) pointed, is weakened and might even be reversed in this context. Also, the median voter may choose a negative tax rate, even if he or she is poorer than the mean, in order to stimulate production of public goods. The relevance of the model is illustrated with an application to the financing of higher education.
Original languageEnglish
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
Volume27
Issue number1
Pages (from-to)201-213
Number of pages13
ISSN0176-2680
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2011

Keywords

  • Faculty of Social Sciences

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