Abstract
Defiant sovereignism: Anti-EU discursive strategies of the Orban regime after the EP decision to recommend Article 7 procedures against Hungary
Miklos Sukosd University of Copenhagen Department of Media, Cognition and Communication [email protected] https://mcc.ku.dk/
Abstract
How did Hungary’s populist Orban regime react after the European Parliament voted to trigger the Article 7 sanctioning process against Hungary on September 12, 2018 in Strasbourg? The critical EP document points out many concerns related the breach of democratic norms and institutions in Hungary. As a reaction to the EP decision, the Orban government attempted to reframe the focus, terms and scope of the debate in fundamental ways. This article explores seven communicative strategies that define „defiant sovereignism” as a radical nationalist, populist political discourse. In conclusion, the debate around triggering Article 7 procedures created a radically new, joint public sphere where the domestic and European levels of debate became deeply interpenetrated. In the novel dynamic of this joint public sphere, Orban addressed his domestic constituency. In that way, the hard sovereignist discourses that had been previously used in the Hungarian domestic political market, prevailed over the more moderate, Euro-compatible discourses, that Orban had used before at the European level. This straightforward articulation of defiant sovereignism may contribute to the formation of a right-wing populist political alliance, and new patterns in European party politics.
Introduction
Hungary represents a fully-fledged case of populist government in the EU, as populist nationalism has become the key legitimizing discourse of the Orban regime. As opposed to several European populist parties that still challenge more established parties from opposition, Orban’s populist party Fidesz has been in power uninterruptedly for a third term, and solidified a stable political regime since 2010. In that sense, Hungary’s case may show what kind of European political strategies populist parties may adopt in other EU member states, once they acquire and keep power for a significant period.
As an integral part of a wide and flexible discursive repertoire of the populist nationalism of the Orban regime, there has been a growing emphasis on sovereignism and various forms of explicit and implicit anti-EU discourses. This paper explores the case of how the Orban regime reacted after the European Parliament voted to trigger the Article 7 sanctions process against Hungary on September 12, 2018 in Strasbourg. This has been a historical vote in the European Parliament, as this was first time that the EP launched the Article 7 procedures against a member state.
The EP decision triggering Article 7 procedures
The European Parliament’s report prepared by Green MEP Judith Sargentini established that a “clear risk” of a serious breach by Hungary of the values of the EU called for the Article 7 procedure to be opened. The Article 7 procedures are complex and although may ultimately lead to the suspension of Hungary’s voting rights, the real political chances for that outcome may be slim and the process may take for several years. Nevertheless the conflict between the Hungarian government and the European Parliament opened new political frontlines and even horizons in the struggle between more established party politics and popular sovereignism in Europe.
The report was approved by over a 2/3 majority in the EP, with 448 votes in favour, 197 against and 48 abstentions. Equally important is the fact that a clear majority of the European People’s Party (the party family of Fidesz) voted against Orban. 115 EPP members, including most of the German CDU members, voted for triggering the procedures, only 57 supported Orban, and 28 abstained.
The EP document points out many concerns related the breach of democratic norms and institutions in Hungary. These include problems regarding the constitutional system, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary; corruption; freedom of expression, privacy and data protection; freedom of association and religion; academic freedom, as well as the right of equal treatment (minority rights) and the fundamental rights of migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees; and social rights. Making the Hungarian government accountable for its non-democratic record in a structured way in a high-stake situation represented the most important conflict so far between Hungary as an externally constrained, non-democratic (hybrid) regime within the European Union (Bozóki & Hegedűs 2018).
As a reaction to the critical report and its approval by the European Parliament, Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his government attempted to reframe the focus, terms and scope of the debate in fundamental ways. Instead of engaging in a factual countering the account of the report, Orban tried to radically change the subject and nature of the discussion. Some elements of this discourse were already present in his uncooperative, confrontational speech on the EP floor. Also, shortly after the EP’s approval of the report, the propaganda ministry of the Hungarian government launched an “extensive informational campaign” (Balogh 2018), to be supported by and echoed in all pro-government media in the country (which actually represent the overwhelming majority of the media system).
According to the key message of the campaign, everybody should understand that “the Sargentini Report is based on lies and that the European Parliament, after breaking rules and regulations, voted for it in order to put political pressure on Hungary” (quoted by Balogh 2018).
Defiant discursive strategies
Key discursive strategies of the Orban regime’s campaign include:
1. The EP decision is actually not about the democratic performance of Hungarian government, but it represents an illegitimate political judgement of the “pro-migration” forces in the EU. The government campaign states over and over that “the European Parliament’s pro-migration majority wants to silence us because we defend our homeland and Europe with a fence.”
2. At the time when “Muslim invaders” try to occupy Europe, Hungary took the role of defending Europe. In this sense, the Orban regime is the historical heir of the tradition of anti-Ottoman fighters in the Middle Ages. This is what the real debate is about: the self-defense of independent Hungary.
3. Personal attacks on Sargentini, including a government-sponsored video and poster campaign that represents her as a protégé of Hungarian-Jewish-American billionaire sponsor George Soros. This visual representation builds on major previous propaganda campaigns in which Soros was presented as the sponsor of Hungarian opposition parties as well as mass migration to the country that they supposedly support.
4. Personal attacks on Hungarian members of the EP who voted for the report. Fidesz politicians and government-controlled propaganda media routinely refer to them as traitors of the nation.
5. Attacks on the EP in particular, and the EU in general, suggesting that these institutions do not have the authority to interfere with domestic matters on Hungary. Policy decisions of the “democratically elected” government cannot be overruled or superseded by European institutions.
6. The EP cheated—an official refusal to accept the results of the EP vote. The Hungarian government decided to bring to the European Court of Justice the case of how the abstentions should have been counted in the vote in the EP. “The Government will be contesting the European Parliament (EP) vote on the Sargentini Report at the European Court of Justice in view of the fact that a two-thirds majority was achieved by ignoring the votes in abstention, in violation of the Treaty of Lisbon”, the Hungarian government announced.
7. Full identification of the government and the people. The EP debate and vote did not criticize the performance the Hungarian government, but actually judged the Hungarian people themselves. In that way the EP did not only overstep its legitimate sphere of authority, but judging a whole people negatively, hurt the dignity and national feelings of the whole Hungarian people.
These discursive strategies by Orban and his government’s propaganda machine present the EP and the EU as enemies. The EP and the EU are represented as external, alien forces that threaten the legitimate and sovereign Hungarian government and wants to overwhelm the country with an evil plan: the settlement of an unlimited number of Muslim migrants. In this sense, it is implied—sometimes implicitely, sometimes more exlicitely--that a freedom fight, a war of independence from the European Union’s repressive authority is well-reasoned and necessary.
An end to the peacock dance
From his takeover in 2010 until the EP debate in 2018, Orban and his regime tried to carefully seperate its gradually hardening sovereignist discourses that were to be used in the Hungarian domestic political market vs. the smoother, more moderate, Euro-compatible discourses, that were designed for external--European level—use. However, the discussion and approval of the EP report ended this intricate „peacock dance” (a term used by Orban himself to characterize his strategy in the EU (Pávatánc 2012; Csaky 2018)). However, the debate before and after triggering Article 7 procedures created a radically new, joint public sphere where the domestic and European levels of debate became deeply interpenetrated. In the floor of the European Parliament Orbán had no choice, he had to address both his domestic constituancy and European politicians simultaneously. The Article 7 debate presented a situation in which the Janus-faced discourse could not have been maintained.
On the one hand, before, during and after the EP debate the Hungarian public had major access (through the remaining free media as well as social media) to critical European discourses concerning the Orban regime. This also partly explains why the majority of public opinion in the country actually supported the approval of the EP report. In a national represenative survey taken during the week after the EP vote (September 12-19), 44% of respondents said they would have voted for the report, 33% said no, and 23% said they did not know (Publicus 2018).
On the other hand, at the European level, during and after the EP debate Orban’s defiant, radical sovereignist position became more explicit. This straightforward articulation of Fidesz’ position may contribute to the formation of a sovereignist political alliance, and new patterns in European party politics (Müller 2018) before or after the EP elections 2019.
Bibliography
Balogh, S. Eva. 2018. A New Propaganda Campaign, This Time Against the European Parliament. 2018. Hungarian Spectrum, September 23, 2018. http://hungarianspectrum.org/tag/sargentini-report/
Bozóki, András Bozóki & Dániel Hegedűs. 2018. An externally constrained hybrid regime: Hungary in the European Union, Democratization, 25:7, 1173-1189.
Csaky, Zselyke. 2018. The End of Viktor Orban’s Peacock Dance. Foreign Policy, September 14, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/14/the-end-of-viktor-orbans-peacock-dance-hungary-eu-article-7-epp-european-parliament/
Müller, Jan-Werner. 2018. What Happens When an Autocrat’s Conservative Enablers Finally Turn on Him? The Atlantic, September 13, 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/orban-hungary-europe-populism-illiberalism/570136/
Pávatánc [Peacock dance]. 2012. Népszabadság June 4, 2012. http://nol.hu/velemeny/20120604-pavatanc-1312137
Publicus, 2018. A Sargentini-jelentés megítélése [Public opinion about the Sargentini report]. September 23, 2018. https://www.facebook.com/notes/publicus-int%C3%A9zet/a-sargentini-jelent%C3%A9s-meg%C3%ADt%C3%A9l%C3%A9se/1015588933358845
Miklos Sukosd University of Copenhagen Department of Media, Cognition and Communication [email protected] https://mcc.ku.dk/
Abstract
How did Hungary’s populist Orban regime react after the European Parliament voted to trigger the Article 7 sanctioning process against Hungary on September 12, 2018 in Strasbourg? The critical EP document points out many concerns related the breach of democratic norms and institutions in Hungary. As a reaction to the EP decision, the Orban government attempted to reframe the focus, terms and scope of the debate in fundamental ways. This article explores seven communicative strategies that define „defiant sovereignism” as a radical nationalist, populist political discourse. In conclusion, the debate around triggering Article 7 procedures created a radically new, joint public sphere where the domestic and European levels of debate became deeply interpenetrated. In the novel dynamic of this joint public sphere, Orban addressed his domestic constituency. In that way, the hard sovereignist discourses that had been previously used in the Hungarian domestic political market, prevailed over the more moderate, Euro-compatible discourses, that Orban had used before at the European level. This straightforward articulation of defiant sovereignism may contribute to the formation of a right-wing populist political alliance, and new patterns in European party politics.
Introduction
Hungary represents a fully-fledged case of populist government in the EU, as populist nationalism has become the key legitimizing discourse of the Orban regime. As opposed to several European populist parties that still challenge more established parties from opposition, Orban’s populist party Fidesz has been in power uninterruptedly for a third term, and solidified a stable political regime since 2010. In that sense, Hungary’s case may show what kind of European political strategies populist parties may adopt in other EU member states, once they acquire and keep power for a significant period.
As an integral part of a wide and flexible discursive repertoire of the populist nationalism of the Orban regime, there has been a growing emphasis on sovereignism and various forms of explicit and implicit anti-EU discourses. This paper explores the case of how the Orban regime reacted after the European Parliament voted to trigger the Article 7 sanctions process against Hungary on September 12, 2018 in Strasbourg. This has been a historical vote in the European Parliament, as this was first time that the EP launched the Article 7 procedures against a member state.
The EP decision triggering Article 7 procedures
The European Parliament’s report prepared by Green MEP Judith Sargentini established that a “clear risk” of a serious breach by Hungary of the values of the EU called for the Article 7 procedure to be opened. The Article 7 procedures are complex and although may ultimately lead to the suspension of Hungary’s voting rights, the real political chances for that outcome may be slim and the process may take for several years. Nevertheless the conflict between the Hungarian government and the European Parliament opened new political frontlines and even horizons in the struggle between more established party politics and popular sovereignism in Europe.
The report was approved by over a 2/3 majority in the EP, with 448 votes in favour, 197 against and 48 abstentions. Equally important is the fact that a clear majority of the European People’s Party (the party family of Fidesz) voted against Orban. 115 EPP members, including most of the German CDU members, voted for triggering the procedures, only 57 supported Orban, and 28 abstained.
The EP document points out many concerns related the breach of democratic norms and institutions in Hungary. These include problems regarding the constitutional system, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary; corruption; freedom of expression, privacy and data protection; freedom of association and religion; academic freedom, as well as the right of equal treatment (minority rights) and the fundamental rights of migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees; and social rights. Making the Hungarian government accountable for its non-democratic record in a structured way in a high-stake situation represented the most important conflict so far between Hungary as an externally constrained, non-democratic (hybrid) regime within the European Union (Bozóki & Hegedűs 2018).
As a reaction to the critical report and its approval by the European Parliament, Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his government attempted to reframe the focus, terms and scope of the debate in fundamental ways. Instead of engaging in a factual countering the account of the report, Orban tried to radically change the subject and nature of the discussion. Some elements of this discourse were already present in his uncooperative, confrontational speech on the EP floor. Also, shortly after the EP’s approval of the report, the propaganda ministry of the Hungarian government launched an “extensive informational campaign” (Balogh 2018), to be supported by and echoed in all pro-government media in the country (which actually represent the overwhelming majority of the media system).
According to the key message of the campaign, everybody should understand that “the Sargentini Report is based on lies and that the European Parliament, after breaking rules and regulations, voted for it in order to put political pressure on Hungary” (quoted by Balogh 2018).
Defiant discursive strategies
Key discursive strategies of the Orban regime’s campaign include:
1. The EP decision is actually not about the democratic performance of Hungarian government, but it represents an illegitimate political judgement of the “pro-migration” forces in the EU. The government campaign states over and over that “the European Parliament’s pro-migration majority wants to silence us because we defend our homeland and Europe with a fence.”
2. At the time when “Muslim invaders” try to occupy Europe, Hungary took the role of defending Europe. In this sense, the Orban regime is the historical heir of the tradition of anti-Ottoman fighters in the Middle Ages. This is what the real debate is about: the self-defense of independent Hungary.
3. Personal attacks on Sargentini, including a government-sponsored video and poster campaign that represents her as a protégé of Hungarian-Jewish-American billionaire sponsor George Soros. This visual representation builds on major previous propaganda campaigns in which Soros was presented as the sponsor of Hungarian opposition parties as well as mass migration to the country that they supposedly support.
4. Personal attacks on Hungarian members of the EP who voted for the report. Fidesz politicians and government-controlled propaganda media routinely refer to them as traitors of the nation.
5. Attacks on the EP in particular, and the EU in general, suggesting that these institutions do not have the authority to interfere with domestic matters on Hungary. Policy decisions of the “democratically elected” government cannot be overruled or superseded by European institutions.
6. The EP cheated—an official refusal to accept the results of the EP vote. The Hungarian government decided to bring to the European Court of Justice the case of how the abstentions should have been counted in the vote in the EP. “The Government will be contesting the European Parliament (EP) vote on the Sargentini Report at the European Court of Justice in view of the fact that a two-thirds majority was achieved by ignoring the votes in abstention, in violation of the Treaty of Lisbon”, the Hungarian government announced.
7. Full identification of the government and the people. The EP debate and vote did not criticize the performance the Hungarian government, but actually judged the Hungarian people themselves. In that way the EP did not only overstep its legitimate sphere of authority, but judging a whole people negatively, hurt the dignity and national feelings of the whole Hungarian people.
These discursive strategies by Orban and his government’s propaganda machine present the EP and the EU as enemies. The EP and the EU are represented as external, alien forces that threaten the legitimate and sovereign Hungarian government and wants to overwhelm the country with an evil plan: the settlement of an unlimited number of Muslim migrants. In this sense, it is implied—sometimes implicitely, sometimes more exlicitely--that a freedom fight, a war of independence from the European Union’s repressive authority is well-reasoned and necessary.
An end to the peacock dance
From his takeover in 2010 until the EP debate in 2018, Orban and his regime tried to carefully seperate its gradually hardening sovereignist discourses that were to be used in the Hungarian domestic political market vs. the smoother, more moderate, Euro-compatible discourses, that were designed for external--European level—use. However, the discussion and approval of the EP report ended this intricate „peacock dance” (a term used by Orban himself to characterize his strategy in the EU (Pávatánc 2012; Csaky 2018)). However, the debate before and after triggering Article 7 procedures created a radically new, joint public sphere where the domestic and European levels of debate became deeply interpenetrated. In the floor of the European Parliament Orbán had no choice, he had to address both his domestic constituancy and European politicians simultaneously. The Article 7 debate presented a situation in which the Janus-faced discourse could not have been maintained.
On the one hand, before, during and after the EP debate the Hungarian public had major access (through the remaining free media as well as social media) to critical European discourses concerning the Orban regime. This also partly explains why the majority of public opinion in the country actually supported the approval of the EP report. In a national represenative survey taken during the week after the EP vote (September 12-19), 44% of respondents said they would have voted for the report, 33% said no, and 23% said they did not know (Publicus 2018).
On the other hand, at the European level, during and after the EP debate Orban’s defiant, radical sovereignist position became more explicit. This straightforward articulation of Fidesz’ position may contribute to the formation of a sovereignist political alliance, and new patterns in European party politics (Müller 2018) before or after the EP elections 2019.
Bibliography
Balogh, S. Eva. 2018. A New Propaganda Campaign, This Time Against the European Parliament. 2018. Hungarian Spectrum, September 23, 2018. http://hungarianspectrum.org/tag/sargentini-report/
Bozóki, András Bozóki & Dániel Hegedűs. 2018. An externally constrained hybrid regime: Hungary in the European Union, Democratization, 25:7, 1173-1189.
Csaky, Zselyke. 2018. The End of Viktor Orban’s Peacock Dance. Foreign Policy, September 14, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/14/the-end-of-viktor-orbans-peacock-dance-hungary-eu-article-7-epp-european-parliament/
Müller, Jan-Werner. 2018. What Happens When an Autocrat’s Conservative Enablers Finally Turn on Him? The Atlantic, September 13, 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/orban-hungary-europe-populism-illiberalism/570136/
Pávatánc [Peacock dance]. 2012. Népszabadság June 4, 2012. http://nol.hu/velemeny/20120604-pavatanc-1312137
Publicus, 2018. A Sargentini-jelentés megítélése [Public opinion about the Sargentini report]. September 23, 2018. https://www.facebook.com/notes/publicus-int%C3%A9zet/a-sargentini-jelent%C3%A9s-meg%C3%ADt%C3%A9l%C3%A9se/1015588933358845
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Publication date | 27 Sept 2018 |
| Publication status | Published - 27 Sept 2018 |
| Event | DSE - ECSA Annual Conference: EU Policy in times of crises - Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark Duration: 26 Sept 2018 → 26 Sept 2018 https://events.ruc.dk/DSE-ECSAConference2018 |
Conference
| Conference | DSE - ECSA Annual Conference |
|---|---|
| Location | Roskilde University |
| Country/Territory | Denmark |
| City | Roskilde |
| Period | 26/09/2018 → 26/09/2018 |
| Internet address |
