Decreasing serial cost sharing: an axiomatic characterization

Jens Leth Hougaard; Lars Peter Raahave Østerdal

doi:10.1007/s00182-009-0165-6

Decreasing serial cost sharing: an axiomatic characterization

Jens Leth Hougaard, Lars Peter Raahave Østerdal

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The increasing serial cost sharing rule of Moulin and Shenker (Econometrica 60:1009-1037, 1992) and the decreasing serial rule of de Frutos (J Econ Theory 79:245-275, 1998) are known by their intuitive appeal and striking incentive properties. An axiomatic characterization of the increasing serial rule was provided by Moulin and Shenker (J Econ Theory 64:178-201, 1994). This paper gives an axiomatic characterization of the decreasing serial rule.

Original language	English
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	38
Issue number	4
Pages (from-to)	469-479
Number of pages	11
ISSN	0020-7276
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0165-6
Publication status	Published - 2009

Keywords

Faculty of Social Sciences
cost allocation

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10.1007/s00182-009-0165-6

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title = "Decreasing serial cost sharing: an axiomatic characterization",

abstract = "The increasing serial cost sharing rule of Moulin and Shenker (Econometrica 60:1009-1037, 1992) and the decreasing serial rule of de Frutos (J Econ Theory 79:245-275, 1998) are known by their intuitive appeal and striking incentive properties. An axiomatic characterization of the increasing serial rule was provided by Moulin and Shenker (J Econ Theory 64:178-201, 1994). This paper gives an axiomatic characterization of the decreasing serial rule.",

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N2 - The increasing serial cost sharing rule of Moulin and Shenker (Econometrica 60:1009-1037, 1992) and the decreasing serial rule of de Frutos (J Econ Theory 79:245-275, 1998) are known by their intuitive appeal and striking incentive properties. An axiomatic characterization of the increasing serial rule was provided by Moulin and Shenker (J Econ Theory 64:178-201, 1994). This paper gives an axiomatic characterization of the decreasing serial rule.

AB - The increasing serial cost sharing rule of Moulin and Shenker (Econometrica 60:1009-1037, 1992) and the decreasing serial rule of de Frutos (J Econ Theory 79:245-275, 1998) are known by their intuitive appeal and striking incentive properties. An axiomatic characterization of the increasing serial rule was provided by Moulin and Shenker (J Econ Theory 64:178-201, 1994). This paper gives an axiomatic characterization of the decreasing serial rule.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - cost allocation

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DO - 10.1007/s00182-009-0165-6

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JO - International Journal of Game Theory

JF - International Journal of Game Theory

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Decreasing serial cost sharing: an axiomatic characterization

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Keywords

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