Context-dependent cheating: experimental evidence from 16 countries

David  Pascual‐Ezama; Toke Reinholt Fosgaard; Juan-Camilo Cardenas; Praveen Kujal; Robert F. Veszteg; Beatriz  Gil-Gómez de Liaño; Brian Gunia; Doris Weichselbaumer; Katharina Hilken; Armenak Antinyan; Joyce  Delnoij; Antonios Proestakis; Michael D.  Tira; Yulius  Pratomo; Tarek Jaber-López; Pablo Brañas-Garza

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.04.020

Context-dependent cheating: experimental evidence from 16 countries

David Pascual‐Ezama, Toke Reinholt Fosgaard, Juan-Camilo Cardenas, Praveen Kujal, Robert F. Veszteg, Beatriz Gil-Gómez de Liaño, Brian Gunia, Doris Weichselbaumer, Katharina Hilken, Armenak Antinyan, Joyce Delnoij, Antonios Proestakis, Michael D. Tira, Yulius Pratomo, Tarek Jaber-López, Pablo Brañas-Garza

Section for Environment and Natural Resources

41 Citations (Scopus)

187 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Policy makers use several international indices that characterize countries according to the quality of their institutions. However, no effort has been made to study how the honesty of citizens varies across countries. This paper explores the honesty among citizens across 16 countries with 1440 participants. We employ a very simple task where participants face a trade-off between the joy of eating a fine chocolate and the disutility of having a threatened self-concept because of lying. Despite the incentives to cheat, we find that individuals are mostly honest. Further, international indices that are indicative of institutional honesty are completely uncorrelated with citizens’ honesty for our sample countries.

Original language	English
Journal	Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Volume	116
Pages (from-to)	379–386
Number of pages	8
ISSN	0167-2681
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.04.020
Publication status	Published - 1 Aug 2015

Access to Document

10.1016/j.jebo.2015.04.020Licence: CC BY-NC-ND

Context-dependent cheating: Experimental evidence from 16 countriesFinal published version, 866 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

Cite this

Pascual‐Ezama, D., Fosgaard, T. R., Cardenas, J.-C., Kujal, P., Veszteg, R. F., Gil-Gómez de Liaño, B., Gunia, B., Weichselbaumer, D., Hilken, K., Antinyan, A., Delnoij, J., Proestakis, A., Tira, M. D., Pratomo, Y., Jaber-López, T., & Brañas-Garza, P. (2015). Context-dependent cheating: experimental evidence from 16 countries. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 116, 379–386. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.04.020

Pascual‐Ezama, D, Fosgaard, TR, Cardenas, J-C, Kujal, P, Veszteg, RF, Gil-Gómez de Liaño, B, Gunia, B, Weichselbaumer, D, Hilken, K, Antinyan, A, Delnoij, J, Proestakis, A, Tira, MD, Pratomo, Y, Jaber-López, T & Brañas-Garza, P 2015, 'Context-dependent cheating: experimental evidence from 16 countries', Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 116, pp. 379–386. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.04.020

@article{b3751e4599e34891ae8e315253b8fcf9,

title = "Context-dependent cheating: experimental evidence from 16 countries",

abstract = "Policy makers use several international indices that characterize countries according to the quality of their institutions. However, no effort has been made to study how the honesty of citizens varies across countries. This paper explores the honesty among citizens across 16 countries with 1440 participants. We employ a very simple task where participants face a trade-off between the joy of eating a fine chocolate and the disutility of having a threatened self-concept because of lying. Despite the incentives to cheat, we find that individuals are mostly honest. Further, international indices that are indicative of institutional honesty are completely uncorrelated with citizens{\textquoteright} honesty for our sample countries.",

author = "David Pascual‐Ezama and Fosgaard, {Toke Reinholt} and Juan-Camilo Cardenas and Praveen Kujal and Veszteg, {Robert F.} and {Gil-G{\'o}mez de Lia{\~n}o}, Beatriz and Brian Gunia and Doris Weichselbaumer and Katharina Hilken and Armenak Antinyan and Joyce Delnoij and Antonios Proestakis and Tira, {Michael D.} and Yulius Pratomo and Tarek Jaber-L{\'o}pez and Pablo Bra{\~n}as-Garza",

year = "2015",

month = aug,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1016/j.jebo.2015.04.020",

language = "English",

volume = "116",

pages = "379–386",

journal = "Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization",

issn = "0167-2681",

publisher = "Elsevier",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Context-dependent cheating

T2 - experimental evidence from 16 countries

AU - Pascual‐Ezama, David

AU - Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt

AU - Cardenas, Juan-Camilo

AU - Kujal, Praveen

AU - Veszteg, Robert F.

AU - Gil-Gómez de Liaño, Beatriz

AU - Gunia, Brian

AU - Weichselbaumer, Doris

AU - Hilken, Katharina

AU - Antinyan, Armenak

AU - Delnoij, Joyce

AU - Proestakis, Antonios

AU - Tira, Michael D.

AU - Pratomo, Yulius

AU - Jaber-López, Tarek

AU - Brañas-Garza, Pablo

PY - 2015/8/1

Y1 - 2015/8/1

N2 - Policy makers use several international indices that characterize countries according to the quality of their institutions. However, no effort has been made to study how the honesty of citizens varies across countries. This paper explores the honesty among citizens across 16 countries with 1440 participants. We employ a very simple task where participants face a trade-off between the joy of eating a fine chocolate and the disutility of having a threatened self-concept because of lying. Despite the incentives to cheat, we find that individuals are mostly honest. Further, international indices that are indicative of institutional honesty are completely uncorrelated with citizens’ honesty for our sample countries.

AB - Policy makers use several international indices that characterize countries according to the quality of their institutions. However, no effort has been made to study how the honesty of citizens varies across countries. This paper explores the honesty among citizens across 16 countries with 1440 participants. We employ a very simple task where participants face a trade-off between the joy of eating a fine chocolate and the disutility of having a threatened self-concept because of lying. Despite the incentives to cheat, we find that individuals are mostly honest. Further, international indices that are indicative of institutional honesty are completely uncorrelated with citizens’ honesty for our sample countries.

U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.04.020

DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.04.020

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0167-2681

VL - 116

SP - 379

EP - 386

JO - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

ER -

Context-dependent cheating: experimental evidence from 16 countries

Abstract

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this