Collusion in Markets with Imperfect Price Information on Both Sides

Christian Schultz

doi:10.1007/s11151-016-9539-7

Collusion in Markets with Imperfect Price Information on Both Sides

Christian Schultz

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The paper considers tacit collusion in markets that are not fully transparent on both sides. Consumers only detect prices with some probability before deciding which firm to purchase from, and each firm only detects the other firm’s price with some probability. Increasing transparency on the producer side facilitates collusion, while increasing transparency on the consumer side makes collusion more difficult. Conditions are given under which increases in a common factor that affects transparency positively on both sides are pro-competitive. With two standard information technologies, this holds when firms are easier to inform than are consumers.

Original language	English
Journal	Review of Industrial Organization
Volume	50
Issue number	3
Pages (from-to)	287-301
ISSN	0889-938X
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-016-9539-7
Publication status	Published - 1 May 2017

Keywords

Faculty of Social Sciences

Access to Document

10.1007/s11151-016-9539-7

https://curis.ku.dk/ws/files/13458195/PDFLicence: Unspecified

Cite this

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