Abstract
When Cusanus scholarship emerged in the nineteenth century, it conformed with the prevailing analytical requirements in the history of philosophy. Scholars strove to identify Cusanus' system of philosophy and its all-embracing principle, the coincidentia oppositorum. Bruno's texts were subjected to the same method. Cusanus' doctrine of coincidentia oppositorum thus became regarded as a crucial principle in Bruno's system of philosophy, and remains so until this day. In this article, the author argues that these historiographical requirements rest on an erroneous assumption, namely that pre-seventeenth- century thinkers intended to develop systems of philosophy. The article points out the distorting, interpretative consequences of this assumption in the case of Bruno.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Journal | Bruniana e Campanelliana |
Volume | XVII |
Issue number | 2 |
Pages (from-to) | 381-400 |
Number of pages | 20 |
ISSN | 1125-3819 |
Publication status | Published - 2011 |