Abstract
In this paper, I discuss the aetiological account of biological interests, developed by Varner (1998), in the context of artefactual organisms envisioned by current research in synthetic biology. In "Sections 2-5", I present Varner's theory and criticise it for being incapable of ascribing non-derivative interests to artefactual organisms due to their lack of a history of natural selection. In "Sections 6-7", I develop a new alternative to Varner's account, building on the organisational theory of biological teleology and function. I argue that the organisational account of biological interest is superior to Varner's aetiological account because it (i) can accommodate both artefactual and naturally evolved organisms, (ii) provides a nonarbitrary and practical way of determining biological interests, (iii) supports the claim that organisms have interests in a sense in which artefacts do not, and (iv) avoids the possibility of there being a conflict between what an organismic part is supposed to do and what is in the interest of the organism.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Philosophy & Technology |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Pages (from-to) | 525-541 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| ISSN | 2210-5433 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 2012 |
Keywords
- Faculty of Humanities