Beyond the Tilly Thesis “Family Values” and State Formation in Latin Christendom

TY - CHAP

T1 - Beyond the Tilly Thesis “Family Values” and State Formation in Latin Christendom

AU - Gorski, Philip

AU - Sharma, Vivek

PY - 2017/1/1

Y1 - 2017/1/1

N2 - Introduction. “Why did the total number of sovereign states in Western Europe decline so radically between the Late Middle Ages and the Early Modern Era?” This is one of the questions that Charles Tilly posed in Coercion, Capital and European States and in other works. It has since become one of the central questions in the broader literature on European state formation. And as arcane as the question may seem, figuring out the answer is of more than academic interest, because that answer has important implications for the study of international relations and economic development and, through them, for the formulation of international security and aid policies. So what is the answer, then? At present, the dominant orthodoxy can be fairly described as neo-Darwinian. On this account, the laws of state formation are the laws of the jungle writ large. Sovereign states compete for survival in a lawless world governed by force alone. As strong states prey on and swallow up weaker ones, the total number of survivor states gradually declines. Natural selection on military capacity is the fundamental law of state formation. This neo-Darwinian model is part of a larger, bellicist paradigm that makes war the underlying mechanism driving virtually all aspects of state formation. In particular, it is frequently claimed that geopolitical pressures led to the weakening of representative assemblies and other constitutional restraints on monarchical power, the expansion of royal taxes, the centralization of political rule and the bureaucratization of princely administration. While many of these claims have since been challenged or qualified within the specialist literature, the bellicist story has become the standard narrative of state formation within the social sciences and is frequently invoked by policy advocates working outside the academy. While the principal focus of this chapter is on the neo-Darwinian account of state consolidation, we also reconsider the bellicist account of bureaucratization. The chapter is in four parts. In the first, we argue that the neo-Darwinian model is historically anachronistic insofar as it (mis)conceptualizes the dynamics of premodern geopolitics in terms of sovereign states, predatory rulers and total wars. We argue that the dynamics of premodern geopolitics within the core areas of Latin Christendom are better understood in terms of dynastic states, patrimonial rulers and limited wars.

AB - Introduction. “Why did the total number of sovereign states in Western Europe decline so radically between the Late Middle Ages and the Early Modern Era?” This is one of the questions that Charles Tilly posed in Coercion, Capital and European States and in other works. It has since become one of the central questions in the broader literature on European state formation. And as arcane as the question may seem, figuring out the answer is of more than academic interest, because that answer has important implications for the study of international relations and economic development and, through them, for the formulation of international security and aid policies. So what is the answer, then? At present, the dominant orthodoxy can be fairly described as neo-Darwinian. On this account, the laws of state formation are the laws of the jungle writ large. Sovereign states compete for survival in a lawless world governed by force alone. As strong states prey on and swallow up weaker ones, the total number of survivor states gradually declines. Natural selection on military capacity is the fundamental law of state formation. This neo-Darwinian model is part of a larger, bellicist paradigm that makes war the underlying mechanism driving virtually all aspects of state formation. In particular, it is frequently claimed that geopolitical pressures led to the weakening of representative assemblies and other constitutional restraints on monarchical power, the expansion of royal taxes, the centralization of political rule and the bureaucratization of princely administration. While many of these claims have since been challenged or qualified within the specialist literature, the bellicist story has become the standard narrative of state formation within the social sciences and is frequently invoked by policy advocates working outside the academy. While the principal focus of this chapter is on the neo-Darwinian account of state consolidation, we also reconsider the bellicist account of bureaucratization. The chapter is in four parts. In the first, we argue that the neo-Darwinian model is historically anachronistic insofar as it (mis)conceptualizes the dynamics of premodern geopolitics in terms of sovereign states, predatory rulers and total wars. We argue that the dynamics of premodern geopolitics within the core areas of Latin Christendom are better understood in terms of dynastic states, patrimonial rulers and limited wars.

UR - https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/does-war-make-states/F845D0CAE9888FA3539454ED6CFBE4F2

U2 - 10.1017/9781316493694.005

DO - 10.1017/9781316493694.005

M3 - Book chapter

SN - 1107141508

SP - 98

EP - 124

BT - Does War Make States?

A2 - Kaspersen, Lars Bo

A2 - Strandsbjerg, Jeppe

PB - Cambridge University Press

ER -