Are we taxing ourselves?: How deliberation and experience shape voting on taxes

Rupert Sausgruber; Jean-Robert Tyran

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.10.002

Are we taxing ourselves? How deliberation and experience shape voting on taxes

Rupert Sausgruber, Jean-Robert Tyran

Department of Economics

24 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We let consumers vote on tax regimes in experimental markets. We test if taxes on sellers are more popular than taxes on consumers, i.e. on voters themselves, even if taxes on sellers are inefficiently high. Taxes on sellers are more popular if voters underestimate the extent of tax-shifting in the market. We show that inexperienced voters are prone to such a tax-shifting bias, that experience is an effective de-biasing mechanism, but that pre-vote deliberation about tax regimes makes initially held opinions more extreme rather than correct. Our results suggest that voting on taxes is prone to bias and that easy-to-interpret facts are needed to de-bias voters.

Original language	English
Journal	Journal of Public Economics
Volume	95
Issue number	1
Pages (from-to)	164–176
Number of pages	13
ISSN	0047-2727
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.10.002
Publication status	Published - Feb 2011

Keywords

Voting

Access to Document

10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.10.002

Cite this

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title = "Are we taxing ourselves?: How deliberation and experience shape voting on taxes",

abstract = "We let consumers vote on tax regimes in experimental markets. We test if taxes on sellers are more popular than taxes on consumers, i.e. on voters themselves, even if taxes on sellers are inefficiently high. Taxes on sellers are more popular if voters underestimate the extent of tax-shifting in the market. We show that inexperienced voters are prone to such a tax-shifting bias, that experience is an effective de-biasing mechanism, but that pre-vote deliberation about tax regimes makes initially held opinions more extreme rather than correct. Our results suggest that voting on taxes is prone to bias and that easy-to-interpret facts are needed to de-bias voters.",

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author = "Rupert Sausgruber and Jean-Robert Tyran",

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PY - 2011/2

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AB - We let consumers vote on tax regimes in experimental markets. We test if taxes on sellers are more popular than taxes on consumers, i.e. on voters themselves, even if taxes on sellers are inefficiently high. Taxes on sellers are more popular if voters underestimate the extent of tax-shifting in the market. We show that inexperienced voters are prone to such a tax-shifting bias, that experience is an effective de-biasing mechanism, but that pre-vote deliberation about tax regimes makes initially held opinions more extreme rather than correct. Our results suggest that voting on taxes is prone to bias and that easy-to-interpret facts are needed to de-bias voters.

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