Abstract
On the face of it, conflicting constraints are placed on agents' knowledge of their own action: it is demanded that that which is known is "on the outside", but that the way in which it is known is "from the inside". I propose to look at the way in which Anscombe sets up this epistemological paradox and attempts to solve it. I discuss two ways in which Anscombe proposes to dissolve the paradox of agents' knowledge, whereof the first one is rejected. Finally, I discuss different problems for the second way and suggest that we can save the Anscombian framework by rethinking the role of perception in action.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Book series | Grazer Philosophische Studien |
| Volume | 78 |
| Pages (from-to) | 41-67 |
| Number of pages | 27 |
| ISSN | 0165-9227 |
| Publication status | Published - 2009 |
Keywords
- Faculty of Humanities
- Philosophy of action
- G.E.M. Anscombe
- Knowledge of Action