Adaptive Learning in Extensive Form Games and Sequential Equilibrium

TY - JOUR

T1 - Adaptive Learning in Extensive Form Games and Sequential Equilibrium

AU - Groes, Ebbe

AU - Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen

AU - Sloth, Birgitte

N1 - JEL Classification: C72, D83

PY - 1999

Y1 - 1999

N2 - This paper studies adaptive learning in extensive form games and provides conditions for convergence points of adaptive learning to be sequential equilibria. Precisely, we present a set of conditions on learning sequences such that an assessment is a sequential equilibrium if and only if there is a learning sequence fulfilling the conditions, which leads to the assessment

AB - This paper studies adaptive learning in extensive form games and provides conditions for convergence points of adaptive learning to be sequential equilibria. Precisely, we present a set of conditions on learning sequences such that an assessment is a sequential equilibrium if and only if there is a learning sequence fulfilling the conditions, which leads to the assessment

U2 - 10.1007/s001990050244

DO - 10.1007/s001990050244

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0938-2259

VL - 13

SP - 125

EP - 142

JO - Economic Theory

JF - Economic Theory

IS - 1

ER -