Abstract
The paper articulates a puzzle that consists in the prima facie incompatibility between three widely accepted theses. The first thesis is, roughly, that there are intrinsically self-representational thoughts. The second thesis is, roughly, that there is a particular causal constraint on mental representation. The third thesis is, roughly, that nothing causes itself. In this paper, the theses are articulated in a less rough manner with the occurrence of the puzzle as a result. Finally, a number of solution strategies are considered, and a preliminary diagnosis is provided.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Philosophical Psychology |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue number | 6 |
| Pages (from-to) | 890-906 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| ISSN | 0951-5089 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 2014 |