Description
This paper focuses on the notion of disposition (¿¿¿¿) in Plotinus’ virtue ethics. The term ¿¿¿¿ originates from Aristotle’s virtue ethics. In the Nicomachean Ethics (1106b36) ethical virtue is defined as ¿¿¿¿, a tendency or disposition, induced by our habits, to have appropriate feelings. For Aristotle, ethical virtue is a disposition of the soul at an intermediate state between two extremes (deficiency and excess) and the appropriate ethical practice lies on moderation (the proper mean between the two extremes). In the Enneads, Plotinus describes ¿¿¿¿ as a state or condition of the soul, a permanent state of possession, which denotes, on some occasions, a trained habit, faculty or skill. Plotinus contrasts ¿¿¿¿ and d¿¿¿es¿¿: whereas ¿¿¿¿ is a permanent state of the soul related to our intelligible self, d¿¿¿es¿¿ is an impermanent disposition of the soul related to our perceptible self (Ennead VI.1.6-11). However, despite its importance, the role of ¿¿¿¿ in Plotinus’ virtue ethics has been overlooked by modern scholarship. In this paper, I shall argue that ¿¿¿¿ is an important element in Plotinus’ self-centered virtue ethics. For Plotinus, virtue is an ¿¿¿¿ that intellectualizes the soul; it is an active state of being prior to ethical practice (Ennead VI.8.5.27-37).| Period | 20 Jun 2012 → 24 Jun 2012 |
|---|---|
| Held at | Unknown external organisation |