Abstract
The article analyses legal theory on compensation for acts of necessity. It set out to answer why a legally sanctioned act should be subject to compensation as a tort. The article accounts for present doctrines and theories. Based on this overview, the article suggest that the field presently operates from a shared set of idealised facts and that this limits the application of the prevalent theories. In order to devise a more flexible model, the article approaches the issue of compensation as inherent in the necessity decision itself. This sets out to solve the issue of compensation on a case-to-case basis under consideration of what causes the least possible interference. Accordingly, the issue of compensation must include a wide range of arguments and interests, rather than one structuring rule.
| Originalsprog | Engelsk |
|---|---|
| Tidsskrift | Journal of European Tort Law |
| Vol/bind | 8 |
| Udgave nummer | 3 |
| Sider (fra-til) | 297-323 |
| Antal sider | 27 |
| ISSN | 1868-9612 |
| DOI | |
| Status | Udgivet - 20 dec. 2017 |