Abstract
According to Alan Millar, justified beliefs are well-founded beliefs. Millar cashes out the notion of well-foundedness in terms of having an adequate reason to believe something and believing it for that reason. To make his account of justified belief compatible with perceptual justification he appeals to the notion of recognitional ability. It is argued that, due to the fact that Millar's is a knowledge-first view, his appeal to recognitional abilities fails to offer an explanatory account of familiar cases in the literature and, as a consequence, of the notion of perceptual justification.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society |
Vol/bind | 116 |
Udgave nummer | 3 |
Sider (fra-til) | 367-377 |
Antal sider | 11 |
ISSN | 0066-7374 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - okt. 2016 |