Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness (minimal selfhood) in schizophrenia

Mads Gram Henriksen; Josef Parnas; Dan Zahavi

Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness (minimal selfhood) in schizophrenia

Mads Gram Henriksen, Josef Parnas, Dan Zahavi

7 Citationer (Scopus)

12 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

In contemporary consciousness research, we have defended a position of experiential minimalism, arguing that for-me-ness (or minimal selfhood) is a necessary, universal feature of phenomenal consciousness. The concept of for-me-ness refers to the fact that experiences are given first-personally to the subject of experience. To challenge the universality of for-me-ness, several authors have referred to the case of thought insertion as a clear counter example. In this study, we address and refute the claim that episodes of thought insertion represent examples of experiences lacking for-me-ness. We highlight certain unaddressed methodological and psychopathological problems that tend to hamper philosophical discussions of thought insertion. Although thought insertion does not involve a lack of for-me-ness, we do argue that thought insertion involves a disturbed for-me-ness. Finally, we offer a novel account of how for-me-ness is disturbed in schizophrenia spectrum disorders and we discuss how a disturbed for-me-ness may be involved in the formation of thought insertion.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Artikelnummer	102770
Tidsskrift	Consciousness and Cognition
Vol/bind	74
ISSN	1053-8100
Status	Udgivet - sep. 2019

Adgang til dokumentet

Henriksen MG, Parnas J, Zahavi D 2019 Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness in SZForlagets udgivne version, 395 KBLicens: CC BY-NC-ND

Citationsformater

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AB - In contemporary consciousness research, we have defended a position of experiential minimalism, arguing that for-me-ness (or minimal selfhood) is a necessary, universal feature of phenomenal consciousness. The concept of for-me-ness refers to the fact that experiences are given first-personally to the subject of experience. To challenge the universality of for-me-ness, several authors have referred to the case of thought insertion as a clear counter example. In this study, we address and refute the claim that episodes of thought insertion represent examples of experiences lacking for-me-ness. We highlight certain unaddressed methodological and psychopathological problems that tend to hamper philosophical discussions of thought insertion. Although thought insertion does not involve a lack of for-me-ness, we do argue that thought insertion involves a disturbed for-me-ness. Finally, we offer a novel account of how for-me-ness is disturbed in schizophrenia spectrum disorders and we discuss how a disturbed for-me-ness may be involved in the formation of thought insertion.

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