The Perception-Action Model: Counting Computational Mechanisms

Thor Grünbaum

doi:10.1111/mila.12147

The Perception-Action Model: Counting Computational Mechanisms

Thor Grünbaum

Institut for Kommunikation

4 Citationer (Scopus)

366 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Milner and Goodale's Two Visual Systems Hypothesis (TVSH) is regarded as common ground in recent discussions of visual consciousness. A central part of TVSH is a functional model of vision and action (a functional perception-action model, PAM for short). In this paper, I provide a brief overview of these current discussions and argue that there is ambiguity between a strong and a weak version of PAM. I argue that, given a standard way of individuating computational mechanisms, the available evidence cannot be used to distinguish between these versions. This not only has consequences for philosophical theories of the role of visual consciousness but also for the role of experimental evidence in model testing in cognitive neuroscience.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Mind & Language
Vol/bind	32
Udgave nummer	4
Sider (fra-til)	416-445
Antal sider	30
ISSN	0268-1064
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12147
Status	Udgivet - sep. 2017

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Det Humanistiske Fakultet

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10.1111/mila.12147

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The Perception-Action Model: Counting Computational Mechanisms

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